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In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, firms are financially 
constrained and pay different wages because workers have heterogeneous expectations about 
the prospects for advancement offered by each firm’s job ladder. This paper argues that, 
nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive predictions of the perfectly 
competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome. If firms maximize the 
discounted sum of constrained profits, financing expenditure out of retained earnings, profits 
are driven down to zero as the perfectly competitive model predicts. Ex ante identical firms 
may follow different growth paths in which workers work for a lower entry-wage in firms 
expected to grow more. In the steady state, however, workers performing the same job, in ex-
ante identical firms, receive the same wage. I explain when the long run outcome is efficient, 
when it is not, and why firms that produce inefficiently might drive the efficient ones out of 
the market even when the steady state has the positive properties of a Walrasian equilibrium. 
To some extent, it is not technological efficiency but workers’ self-fulfilling expectations 
about their prospects for advancement within the firm what explains which firms have lower 
unit costs, grow more and dominate the market. 
 
Keywords: Industry Evolution - Market Selection Hypothesis - Production under Incomplete 
Markets - Retained Earnings Dynamic - Self-Fulfilling Expectations - Internal Labor Markets 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D52, D61, D84, D92, J41 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a market in which many ﬁrms compete to sell an homogeneous product. Economic theory predicts
that, at least in the long run, proﬁts vanish and each ﬁrm produces the quantity that maximizes proﬁts at the
market price. Although most economists agree about this description of the long run outcome of the process
of industry evolution, it is not so clear what forces lead an industry to that steady state. The theory of industry
equilibrium in competitive markets relies on the existence of a perfect credit market and proﬁt maximizing
ﬁr m st oe x p l a i nw h yp r o ﬁts are dissipated. If there is a complete set of perfectly competitive ﬁnancial markets,
each ﬁrm maximizes its market value, the markets for inputs are perfectly competitive, there are no turnover
costs and there is either free entry or the technology displays constant return to scale, then equilibrium proﬁts
are zero and each active ﬁrm produces the proﬁt maximizing level.
In sharp contrast with these assumptions, however, the empirical evidence suggests that new ﬁrms are ﬁnan-
cially constrained and the labor market, rather than being in a Walrasian equilibrium from the start, it is better
characterized by social institutions which are not present in the theory of the ﬁrm under perfect competition.
Indeed, theproblemsofasymmetricinformationidentiﬁedbyauthorslikeStiglitzandWeiss[12]asthemain
explanation for the failure of the credit market, are particularly important at the early stages of the process of
industry evolution. Therefore, manyﬁrms ﬁnance productionreinvestingtheir own funds. In modern industries,
ﬁnancing through retained earnings is the norm rather than the exception. To quote Allen and Gale [3]:
“Perhaps the most striking point [...] is that in all countries [US, UK, France and Germany] except Japan,
retained earnings are the most important source of funds. External ﬁnance is simply not that important” (p. 76)
The lack of access to credit may prevent ﬁrms from achieving its optimal size from the start and explains
why it takes time for proﬁts to be dissipated. In addition, the presence of asymmetric information among ﬁrms
about the ability of workers causes wage rates to differ from productivity and turnover costs are signiﬁcant.
Therefore, workers tend to be attached to the same ﬁrm for long periods, ﬁrms carry out most of the training of
their employees and prefer to promote employees internally rather than recruiting new workers. Using the term
made popular by Doeringer and Piore [6], ﬁrms set up an internal labor market, with rules that are different
from the ones that prevail in a Walrasian market. As S. Rosen [11] writes:
“Many features of labor markets bear little resemblance to impersonal Walrasian auction markets. Chief among
them is the remarkable degree of observed worker-ﬁrm attachment [...] The typical adult male worker spends
twenty years or more on a single job”
It is apparent that modern industries display many features which are not taken into account in the static
model but are key to understand why industry evolution takes time and how wages evolve. Therefore, the
standard description of ﬁrm and industry behavior is at best the description of a steady state of some growth
dynamics. Economists like Alchian [1] and Friedman [8] recognized this long time ago. However, Nelson and
Winter [10] were the ﬁrst in providing a formal explanation on how such steady state can be attained even if no
2ﬁrm follows a proﬁt maximization rule. The key assumption in their work is thatﬁrms that make positive proﬁts
expand, those that make zero proﬁts do not change capacity while those that make loses contract and search
for new decision rules, a dynamic that can be motivated by the use of retained earnings to ﬁnance investment.
However, Blume and Easley [5] show that even though such retained earnings dynamic explains why ﬁrms that
do not maximize proﬁts are driven out, it may not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium.
The work of Nelson and Winter and Blume and Easley focuses on the role of the retained earnings dynamic
as a substitute for market completeness when the labor market is perfectly competitive. In many industries,
the presence of training costs and ﬁrm speciﬁc abilities not only implies that wages are not closely related to
productivitybutalsothat theyexceedwagesinanotherindustry. This istypicallythe case forthe wageofskilled
intensive jobs at the top of the progression line. Because workers anticipate that they may progress through the
promotion line and obtain those high wages in the future, reservation entry-wages are usually lower than in
other industries. Ceteris paribus, the better the prospects for advancement displayed by the ﬁrm are, the lower
the worker’s reservation entry-wage is. Intuitively prospects for advancement must be positively related with
the growth prospects of the ﬁrm. This introduces an additional self-fulﬁlling aspect in the process of industry
evolution. Indeed, since ﬁrms rely on internal funds, ceteris paribus, those that are believed to have better
growth potentials pay lower wages, have more revenue and end up promoting more workers, fulﬁlling workers’
expectations. This introduces more complexity in the process of industry evolution. If ex-ante identical ﬁrms
follow different growth paths, does the industry converge to a steady state with zero proﬁts? Which ﬁrms
pay lower wages along the transition? What are the efﬁciency properties of the steady state? Is there an
unambiguous positive relationship between technological efﬁciency and growth rates? These are some of the
questions addressed in this work.
This paper argues that when ﬁrms maximize the discounted sum of constrained proﬁts, ﬁnancing expendi-
ture out of retained earnings and the internal labor market arises as a cost minimizing institution, due to ﬁrm
speciﬁc abilities and costly training, the industry converges to a steady state where proﬁts are dissipated. My
analysis corresponds to the case in which ﬁrms do not face a shortage in the supply of skilled workers along
the process of industry evolution. Therefore, adjustment costs do not play any role in this paper. Instead, I con-
centrate on the role of workers’ expectations in shaping factor prices, an aspect that has not been addressed yet
in the literature of industry evolution towards a Walrasian equilibrium. As in Waldman [13], every ﬁrm in the
industry learns something about a worker’s skills by considering his job assignment and can try to hire him.
Therefore, the higher the training cost is or the more general the worker’s skill is, the higher is the wage of pro-
moted workers in a two tasks job ladder. If this wage exceeds the wage those workers could obtain in another
industry, their entry-wage depends on the worker’s expectations about the ﬁrm’s promotion rate.
If ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, I show that workers who carry out equal jobs receive the same wage in the
steady state, regardless of the ﬁrm that hires them, as if the labor market were in a Walrasian equilibrium.
3However, ex-ante identical ﬁrms can follow different growth paths towards the steady state. Ceteris paribus,
ﬁrms that are expected to grow faster hire workers at a lower entry-wage, which implies that technological
efﬁciency may not hold along the transition. However, it does hold in the steady state. Allocative efﬁciency,
instead, is satisﬁed in the steady state if and only if wages at the upper levels of the job ladder are identical
to those in the competing industry so that entry-wages are identical across industries. Otherwise, too little is
produced compared to the efﬁcientallocation of resources. The failure of technological and allocative efﬁciency
is due both to the absence of a perfect credit market as well as the impossibility of enforcing a wage for old
workers equal to their opportunity cost in the competing industry.
I also consider the case of ﬁrms with different technologies. Although economists long time ago recognized
that ﬁrms with lower costs tend to grow more, it is usually argue that cost differentials are due to technological
reasons. However, this neglects the fact that, ceteris paribus,t h o s eﬁrms that are believed to display better
growth prospects can hire workers at a lower wage which, in turn, contributes to lower its costs. This reverse of
causality implies that even ﬁrms that produce inefﬁciently may end up dominating the market if workers believe
they display sufﬁciently better prospects than the efﬁcient ones. Indeed, the workers’ willingness to work for
a low entry-wage can more than compensate the cost disadvantage introduced by an inefﬁcient technology.
C a nt h i sh a p p e ni nas e l f - f u l ﬁlling equilibrium that converges to a Walrasian-like steady state? I construct an
example in which even though proﬁts vanish in the long run, worker’s expectations are fulﬁlled and inefﬁcient
ﬁrms grow more and dominate the market in terms of market share. If at the early stages workers are optimistic
enough about the prospect for advancement offered by the ﬁrms which produce inefﬁciently, almost all workers
e n du pe m p l o y e db yi n e f ﬁcient ﬁrms in the long run. Therefore, almost all workers performing the same job
receive the same wage, as in a Walrasian equilibrium. In contrast with Beker [4], I do not need to assume an
stochastic technology to show that inefﬁcient ﬁrms can dominate a perfectly competitive output market.
My analysis conﬁrms the widespread intuition that in a competitive output market, proﬁts are driven down
to zero and ﬁrms do not face ﬁnancial constraints in the long run. Contrary to the standard static analysis, I do
not need to assume the existence of a perfect capital market or a perfectly competitive labor market. However,
this paper also conﬁrms Winter’s [16, p. 88] skepticism about the efﬁciency of the equilibrium in a world of
incomplete markets where business ﬁrms play the role of a training institution. Indeed, he writes:
“We know how to go about proving the Pareto optimality of equilibria in theoretical systems in which prices pro-
vide the necessary coordinating information, while actors have essentially unlimited memories and computation
power, and contracts are costlessly enforced. We do not know how to -and very likely it is not true- for a system
in which relevant economic information is routinely transmitted by the daily newspaper, or, indeed by any one of
a large number of obviously signiﬁcant social institutions. The list comprises, for example, the mass media, the
schools and other educational institutions, the family, business ﬁrms (in advertising, training programs, etc.)...”
In competitive output markets, the retained earnings dynamic gives an evolutionary advantage to ﬁrms with
lower unit costs. However, unit costs are determined not only by technological efﬁciency but also by wages. In
the presence of internal promotions, unlike in Walrasian markets, worker’s expectations about the opportunities
4for advancement within the ﬁrm are key to determine wages. Therefore, the ﬁtness of a ﬁrm depends not only
on its technological efﬁciency but also on the self-fulﬁlling beliefs of the workers. I conclude that, at least
in the long run, the retained earnings dynamic justiﬁes the use of the standard static analysis of competitive
markets to make positive predictions but does not always justiﬁes its efﬁciency properties. Unlike in Blume and
Easley’s model, even the steady state of the retained earnings dynamic may fail to be efﬁcient in the presence
of internal promotions. As in Arthur [2], what happens at the origin of the industry can have a decisive role on
the technology that dominates the market. However, it is not a network externality or the presence of increasing
returnswhatdrivestheresultinthismodelbuttheself-fulﬁllingbeliefsoftheyoungworkersabouttheprospects
for advancement offered by the ﬁrms.
1.1 Overview
In section 2, I describe a partial equilibrium model of industry evolution in which retained earnings deter-
mine the scale of operation, ﬁrms are long lived and every period a new generation of workers, who live for
two periods, enters the labor force. The description of the labor market is strongly inﬂuenced by Waldman’s
formalization of the arguments in Doeringer and Piore.1
In section 3, I deﬁne an Industry Equilibrium (IE). In an IE, each ﬁrm and the workers it contacts play a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and the output and labor markets clear. Firms may follow different
strategies either because they are endowed with different technologies or because of the existence of multiple
SPNE of the game played between each ﬁrm and the workers. Since training workers is costly, ﬁrms have
an incentive to hire workers trained by a competitor. However, these workers are not as productive as those
promoted internally. Therefore, the higher the training cost is or the more general the training is, the higher the
equilibrium wage of a promoted worker is. In section 4, I show that if the wage of a promoted worker exceeds
what those workers would receive in another industry, the game played by the workers and the ﬁrm has two
SPNE. In one SPNE, every generation of young workers believes the next generation will accept employment at
wages low enough to induce the ﬁrm to promote a large fraction of its current employees the following period.
Anticipating this, they accept employment at a low entry-wage. In another SPNE, every generation of young
workers believes the next generation will accept employment only at a wage so high that the ﬁrm will promote
a small fraction of workers. Therefore, they accept employment only at a high entry-wage.
Instead of looking for a further reﬁnement of the notion of rationality, I analyze how the market share of
ﬁrms which face different labor market conditions evolve along time. In sections 5 and 6, I analyze the dynamic
and efﬁciency properties of the industry equilibrium for the case of ex-ante identical ﬁrms and heterogeneous
ﬁrms, respectively. Conclusions are in section 7. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
1 There are some slight differences between the two models of the labor market. In Waldman’s model, workers ability takes values in
a continuum while in mine it can take only two values but a law of large numbers holds at the ﬁrm level. He assumes that ﬁrms are not
ﬁnancially constrained but instead the technology is such that they hire only one worker each period.
52. THE MODEL
At date zero, the industry adopts a new technology to produce a ﬁnal good. Let q denote the ﬁrm’s output
level. The technology to produce this good requires only labor and the production process can be described as a
function of two tasks. The level at which task 1 and task 2 are performed are denoted by q1 and q2, respectively,
and the production function takes the following functional form:
q = qα
1 · q1−α
2 0 < α < 1.
Task 1 requires a skill that is not industry speciﬁc. If l is the number of workers employed in task 1 then2
q1 (l)=l
Every worker develops a new ability while performing the ﬁrst task. Ability is a random variable that takes
only two values: high or low. Ability turns out to be high with probability λ ∈ (0,1). In order to be able
to perform the second task, a worker needs not only to have high ability, but also to receive some additional
training to develop the industry speciﬁc skill. Then a necessary condition to be able to carry out the second task
is to have performed task 1 in the past. In principle, there are three different ways in which a ﬁrm can learn
whether an old worker has the necessary ability to develop the industry speciﬁc skill:
1. Since ability is revealed while performing task 1, ﬁrms learn which of their employees have developed high
ability. Doeringer and Piore emphasize this point [6, p. 31]:
“The efﬁciency of internal recruitment and screening derives from the fact that existing employees constitute a
readily accessible and knowledgeable source of supply whose skill and behavioral characteristics are well known
to management. Information about internal candidates is generated as a by-product of their work history in the
enterprise.”
At the beginning of period t+1, each worker born at t who developed high ability can be trained, at a unit cost
of c, to perform task 2 during t +1 .I ft h eﬁrm hires those workers to perform task 2 at date t +1 ,t h eﬁrm
is said to promote workers internally. Let si
t be the number of workers promoted internally by ﬁrm i at date
t. If all workers performing the second task have been hired internally then it is said that the ﬁrm has a closed
internal labor market with one entry port.
2. Observing who are the employees that perform the second task in other ﬁrms in the industry, a ﬁrm can learn
who are those that developed high ability. A ﬁrm can make an offer to any of those workers. If the worker
accepts the offer, he does not need additional training to be able to perform the second task in his new job. The
ﬁrm that employs him is said to hire workers externally. However, that employee is not as productive as one
that also has the skill but worked in the same ﬁrm when young. In particular, I assume that e skilled workers
2 I assume that the number of workers takes values in <+ so it would be more appropriate to say that l is the measure of workers hired
by the ﬁrm. The same applies to all other types of labor in this paper.
6that change ﬁrms are equivalent to e
1+θ, with θ > 0, skilled employees who are promoted internally. Let ei
t be
the number of workers that have been trained by another ﬁrm and are hired by ﬁrm i at date t.
3. Firms could also hire a worker who performed the ﬁrst task in another industry when young and screen him
in order to learn whether he has high ability or not. However, as Doeringer and Piore [6, p. 31] note:
“In contrast, potentially interested outsiders must ﬁrst be located and then screened [...] The problem of identi-
fying the variables which will completely predict a new hire’s work performance, however, is generally viewed as
either insoluble or soluble only at a prohibitive cost”.
Accordingly, I rule out this possibility and for the rest of the paper I assume that the second task is performed
either by internally promoted workers or by externally hired employees.




denotes the level of activity of the second task. The parameter θ measures the degree of ﬁrm’s speciﬁcity of
the training process. Greater values of θ corresponds to greater ﬁrm speciﬁcity of the skill obtained during the
training process. The technology to produce q can be written as a function of labor in the following way:
q(l,s,e;α)=q1 (l)
α · q2 (s,e)
1−α
Since production takes time, a ﬁrm that employs (l,s,e) workers at date t, obtains q(l,s,e;α) units of
output at t +1 . Finally, the demand for the good is D(p). I assume that D has standard properties.













where the last condition ensures that demand is zero only at prices high enough so that ﬁrms can make positive




, respectively. This assumption will
ensure that the equilibrium output level is not zero.
2.1 Workers
Everyperiodt ≥ 0,anewgenerationofworkers, wholivefortwoperiods, entersthelaborforce. Workersdo
not consume the good produced by this industry. They only face uncertainty about their ability and, therefore,
about their wage (and consumption) when old. Workers are risk neutral and have preferences over random
bundles of the numeraire that have a discounted expected utility representation with discount rate 0 < β < 1
r.
A worker who does not work in this industry can work in another industry, or at home, and obtain expected
lifetime utility u = w1+β·w2, when young, and w2 ≥ w1, when old. Without loss of generality, one can think
7that w1 and w2 are the expected wages of a young and old worker, respectively, in another industry. Workers
cannot borrow from future wages. Therefore, each worker consumes out of his wage and decides where to work
to maximize his expected utility. Each ﬁrm in this industry faces an inﬁnite supply of ex-ante identical young
workers.
2.2 Efﬁcient Allocations
Since this is a partial equilibrium model, to make efﬁciency considerations one has to make some additional
assumptions. In particular, I assume that the consumer surplus is an adequate measure of welfare and that the
social opportunity cost of working in this industry when young and old, in terms of the numeraire, is given by
w1 and w2, respectively, and 1
r is the socially optimal discount rate. As usual, the set of efﬁcient allocations

















st+1 ≤ λ · lt lt, st ≥ 0
where CS(q) ≡
R q
0 D−1 (x)dx is the Marshallian Consumer Surplus. At any date t ≥ 0, there are only
two relevant types of labor for the planner: the young workers who perform task 1 and the old workers who
performed the ﬁrst task in this industry when young.
An industry produces efﬁciently if more output cannot be produced using at most the same amount of every
input and strictly less of one of them. Allocative efﬁciency holds if the aggregate surplus is maximized. Let










and Q∗ = D(p∗). The following lemma characterizes the set of efﬁcient allocations for those parameters
such that the second constraint in the Social Planner’s problem is not binding. This set of parameters gives the
appropriate benchmark because in all the equilibria I analyze later the constraint does not bind either.
Lemma 2.1 If α > w1
w1+λ·(w2+c) then Q∗ is the efﬁcient level of output while the efﬁcient allocation of labor




















Firms receive a name j in the unit interval and take the output price sequence {pt}
∞
t=0 as given. Each ﬁrm
is endowed with a0 > 0 units of the numeraire and l−1 ≥ 1−α
w2+c · a0 trainees. The lower bound chosen for
l−1 ensures that there is no shortage of skilled workers at date zero.3 One can think that the ﬁrms have been
operating for a while, perhaps using another technology based only in task 1, and know the ability of those
workers that were employed before. I assume that the workers’ distribution across ﬁrms is such that a law of
large numbers holds at each date: if ﬁrm i employs lt workers in task 1 at date t, exactly a fraction λ of these
workers develops high ability.4 Therefore, since training is costly, at most λ·lt workers receive training at date
t and are ready to perform task 2 at date t +1 .
I assume ﬁrms cannot borrow in the capital market. This may be because these ﬁrms are rationed in the
credit market but I do not explicitly model this phenomena. At every date t ≥ 0, each ﬁrm chooses how much
of its assets to use as ﬁnancial capital to hire inputs, 0 ≤ mt ≤ at, a n dw h a tp a r tt oi n v e s ti na na l t e r n a t i v e
activity, bt = at − mt, with gross rate of return r>1. For the rest of the paper, I take this alternative activity
as lending at the interest rate r.I faﬁrm hires (lt,s t,e t) workers and invests bt in bonds at date t, then its assets
at date t +1are
at+1 = pt · qt + r · bt
where qt ≡ q(lt,s t,e t;αi).
At every date t ≥ 0, each ﬁrm collects revenue and learns who are the employees that developed high ability.
In that information set, the ﬁrm decides how much of its assets to allocate as ﬁnancial capital and how to spend
it. That is, the ﬁrm chooses how many workers to contact and what wages to offer so its expenditure does not
exceed mt. The hiring process is described in detail below. Once the hiring phase has ended, production is
carried out. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of decisions.
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Figure 1. Timing of decisions
3 S e eb e l o wf o rm o r ed i s c u s s i o no nt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tt h e internal labor market constraint is never binding.
4 Since independence has no role in this model, the argument in Feldman and Gilles [7] implies that there exists a distribution of
workers for which the law of large numbers holds in every Borel set.
9Although ﬁrms are perfectly competitive in the output market, they are not so in the labor market. This is
because each ﬁrm has private information about the ability of the workers that it employed the previous period.
However, as in Waldman [13], when a ﬁrm makes an offer to a former employee, it realizes that other ﬁrms
in the industry may learn something about that worker’s ability by observing his job assignment and can try to
hire him. Let ve
t ≥ w2 be the equilibrium outside value of a worker who performs task 2. Any worker who
performs the second task at date t can move to another ﬁrm and obtain utility ve
t.5 To simplify the discussion,
I do not model the game of simultaneous offers played by the ﬁrms and those workers that are promoted by its
ﬁrst period employer. However, I do require ve
t to be compatible with the ﬁrms’ strategies in equilibrium.
The interaction between each ﬁrm and the successive generations of workers is described as a game where
ﬁrms take as given both the output price sequence as well as the outside value of a promoted worker. In
principle, there is a large set of labor contracts that a ﬁrm could offer to the young workers. For example, one
could imagine a contract in which a ﬁrm assigns a young worker to task 1, pays him a certain wage at date t
and promises future wages contingent on being promoted or not. One could even think of a contract where the
ﬁrm details the fraction of workers that it will promote at t+1, as in Malcomsom [9]. However, many contracts
like these are not implementable because either the ﬁrm cannot commit to take actions that are not sequentially
rational or the worker cannot commit to stay in the ﬁrm in case of receiving a better offer in the future. In this
work, I restrict myself to spot contracts.
Assumption AC:W h e naﬁrm hires a young worker, it can neither commit to a wage in the event that such
worker is promoted when old nor to a promotion probability.
Each ﬁrm takes as given both the sequence of output prices P = {pt}
∞
t=0 as well as the reservation utility
levels V = {ve
t}
∞
t=0. At every date, the game between the ﬁrm and the successive generations of workers has
two stages:
¥ 1st stage: Each ﬁrm decides how much of its assets (at) to spend as ﬁnancial capital, 0 ≤ m ≤ at.I t
also decides the number (l,s,e) ∈ <3
+ of workers it wants to hire and makes wage offers for young and old
workers, (w,v) ∈ <2
+, such that its expenditure does not exceed its ﬁnancial capital.
w · l +( v + c) · s + v · e = m (1)
Implicit in the ﬁnancial constraint (1) is the assumption that the ﬁrm offers the same wage to all employees
performing task 2, independently of their past employment history. In principle, one could allow the ﬁrm to
make different wage offers to those promoted internally and those hired in the market. As I show below, since
workers perform task 2 only in the last period of their life, then no ﬁrm has an incentive to pay to that worker
5 Notice that I deﬁned the outside value of a worker that peforms task 2 to be independent of his employment history. This seems
reasonable because all high ability workers are equally productive when working in any other ﬁrm different from the one that trained
them.
10more than what the market would pay. Thus, given the assumption that all promoted workers are equally
productive in a ﬁrm different from the one that trained them, the assumption of equal wage offers within the
ﬁrm is made without loss of generality to simplify notation.
Each young worker is approached by just one ﬁrm. For simplicity, I assume that ﬁrms adopt an “up or out”
promotion system: old workers who are not promoted are ﬁred. This assumption is also made without loss of
generality because, as it will become clear later in the paper, in equilibrium, no ﬁrm could make a proﬁtb y
hiring an old worker to perform task one. Since the number of internal promotions cannot exceed the number
of employees that developed high ability, then the ﬁrm faces the following “internal labor market” constraint:
0 ≤ st ≤ λ · lt−1 (2)
If st < λ · lt−1,t h e nt h eﬁrm decides at random who receives training because, from the ﬁrm’s point of view,
high ability workers are homogeneous. It follows that each worker hired at t − 1 has an ex-ante objective
probability st
lt−1 of being promoted at t.
¥ 2nd stage: Each young worker contacted by ﬁrm i observes the wage offer, wi
t, and decides whether to
accept (A) or reject (R) it. Those old workers that went through the training process decide whether to stay in
the ﬁrm that trained them (A) or to move to another one (R) where they obtain utility ve
t.
More formally, let dt =( l,s,e,m,b,w,v) be the quantity demanded of each factor, the ﬁnancial decisions
and the wages offered by a ﬁrm at date t.L e tdw
t ∈ {A,R}×{ A,R} be the date t responses of young and old
workers and let ht =( dt,d w
t ) be the actions of the players at date t ≥ 0.6 Let h0 =( l−1,a 0) be the history at
the start of play, ht =( h0,h 1,...,h t−1) denotes the partial history of play up to date t ≥ 1 and ht−τ the partial













m + b = at
w · l +( v + c) · s + v · e = m







pt−1 · q(lt−1,s t−1,e t−1;α)+r · bt−1 if dw
t−1 =( A,A)
r · bt−1 +
¡
wt−1 · lt−1 · 1σ1,t−1=R + vt−1 · st−1 · 1σ2,t−1=R
¢
otherwise
and 1σk,t=R is the function that takes value 1 if σk,t = R and zero otherwise. Therefore, the set of all histories
up to date t is
Ht = {(h0,...,h t−1):dτ ∈ A(hτ) & dw
τ ∈ {A,R}×{ A,R} for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ t − 1}
6 Implicit in the description of the actions played at date t, ht, is the assumption that all workers of the same generation take the same
decision. This assumption is made without loss of generality because I only consider stationary equilibria where workers of the same
generation play the same history independent strategy against a given ﬁrm.
11and the set of terminal histories is H =
©
(h0,h 1,...):( h0,h 1,...,ht−1) ∈ Ht for all t ≥ 0
ª
.
At date t, each young worker observes history ht and decides whether to accept or reject the wage offer he
received. If he rejects, he works in another industry with lifetime utility u. The payoff that a young worker
obtains at date t is
u1 (x,w)=
½
w if x = A
w1 if x = R
Each old worker who worked in the ﬁrm when young and received training can stay in the ﬁrm that trained
him or leave. If he stays, he obtains utility vt. However, he can obtain utility ve
t by leaving to another ﬁrm. It




vt if x = A
ve
t if x = R
Let Γ(P,V,α) be the extensive form game played between a ﬁrm with technology α and the inﬁnite gen-
erations of workers. A strategy for ﬁrm j speciﬁes the number of wage offers it makes for each task at date t,
(lt,s t,e t), the wages it offers, (wt,v t) and the ﬁnancial decisions, (mt,b t), as a function of the history. For-
mally, a pure strategy for the ﬁrm is a sequence f = {ft}
∞
t=0 where ft : Ht → A
¡
ht¢
.L e tF be the ﬁrm’s set
of pure strategies.
The strategy of a worker born at date t speciﬁes whether he accepts or rejects the offer made by a ﬁrm at
date t and whether he stays or moves to another ﬁrm at t +1after receiving training. That is, the strategy of
a worker born at t is a pair σt =( σ1,t,σ2,t) where σ1,t : Ht ×< + → {A,R} is the decision of the young
worker who receives an offer to perform task 1 and σ2,t : Ht+1 ×< + → {A,R} is his response at t +1after
going through the training process and being offered promotion by his ﬁrst period employer. Let Wt be the set
of pure strategies for the workers born at date t. I assume that all workers of the same generation play the same
strategy against a given ﬁrm. Therefore, the sequence σ = {(σ1,t,σ2,t)}
∞
t=0 ∈ W ≡ W0 × ... × Wt × ... is the
collection of strategies that the inﬁnite generations of workers play against a ﬁrm. For any (f,σ) ∈ F × W,l e t
− →














denote the actions chosen by the players before date t ≥ 0,
i . e .t h ep a t ho fp l a yu pt od a t et.L e t− → f t =










be the actions chosen at date t by the ﬁr ma n dw o r k e r so nt h ep a t ho fp l a yo f(f,σ).
Each worker decides whether to accept or reject an offer in order to maximize his payoff. I deﬁne the set of


















































































if b σ1,t (·)=A
u1 [σ1,t,w t]+β · w2 otherwise
where the second line reﬂects that if a generation of workers reject working in the ﬁr m ,t h e nt h a tﬁrm closes.
Finally, I deﬁne the equilibrium concept for the game Γ(P,V,α). Since both young and old workers take








, respectively, the game Γ(P,V,α) is one of imper-
fect information. Therefore, subgame perfection does not exclude the possibility that workers follow a strategy
that prescribes a suboptimal action on some information set out of the path of play. In particular, it does not
eliminate the possibility that for some ε > 0, old workers reject any wage offer below ve
t + ε even though they
would be strictly better off accepting it. If ﬁrms make a proﬁt by hiring workers at a wage ve
t + ε, their best re-
sponse would be to offer that wage to the old workers even though no other ﬁrm is willing to pay that sum. To
eliminate these equilibria, I consider only those SPNE in which no worker chooses a strictly dominated action
in or out of the equilibrium path.




















for all v ≥ 0 and x ∈ {A,R}
2. U
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for all f ∈ F.
3. INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, Ideﬁne anIndustryEquilibrium. In anIndustryEquilibrium, ﬁrms take both the output prices
as well as the reservation values of a skilled worker as given, the strategies of ﬁrms and workers constitute a
13*SPNEofΓ(P,V,α)andallrelevantmarketsclearwhenﬁrmsandworkersbehaveaccordingtotheequilibrium
path of the *SPNE they play. In section 3.1, I introduce the notion of prospects for advancement and show that
in any IE, ceteris paribus, one ﬁrm displays better prospects for advancement than another if and only if it
promotes a larger fraction of its workers than its competitor. In section 3.2, I discuss what determines the
outside value of a promoted worker.
In the previous section, I described the behavior of workers and ﬁrms for exogenous sequences of the output
price and the outside-value of promoted workers. This analysis is appropriate because each ﬁrm is competitive
in the output market and once a worker is promoted the ﬁrm loses any monopoly power over him. However,
both the output price sequence as well as the outside value of the promoted workers actually depend on the
aggregate behavior of the ﬁrms through the corresponding market clearing condition. On the one hand, the
output price, pt, evolves such that the output market clears every period. On the other hand, the utility that a
promoted worker can obtain by moving to another ﬁrm, ve
t, must be consistent with the ﬁrms’ actions on the
equilibrium path of the *SPNE of the game Γ(P,V,αi).
At date zero, after the ﬁrms announce their names, every worker who is contacted by a ﬁrm updates his
common prior about the strategy of that ﬁrm after observing the realization of a binary sunspot variable that
assigns probability µH to the strategy fH and 1 − µH to the strategy fL. To be more precise, the decision rule






∈ Wt ×Wt.I na nI E ,a
measure µH ∈ (0,1) of the ﬁrms follow strategy fH while the rest of the ﬁrms follow strategy fL. At date zero,
the assets in hands of those ﬁrms that follow strategies fH and fL are aH





respectively. If µH =0or µH =1 ,t h e na l lﬁrms follow the same strategy. For any i ∈ {L,H}, qi
t denotes the
output produced at date t, on the equilibrium path of the *SPNE
¡
fi,σi¢
,b yaﬁrm that follows strategy fi.
Deﬁnition 3.1 An Industry Equilibrium (IE) is (P,V ) ∈ <∞
+ ×<∞














1. For each i ∈ {L,H},
¡
fi,σi¢






t · µH = D(pt), for all t ≥ 0.
3. − → e i








∂et ≤ 0 for
all t ≥ 0 (with equality for some i if ve
t > w2.)






This equilibrium concept does not impose the restriction that ex-ante identical ﬁrms must follow the same
strategy in the game Γ(P,V,α). The behavior of ﬁrms and workers may be heterogenous either because ﬁrms
14have different technologies or due to a coordination problem among the inﬁnite generations of workers. For
example, if for some sequences (P,V) ∈ <∞
+ ×< ∞
+ the game Γ(P,V,α) has multiple *SPNE equilibria,
ex-ante identical ﬁrms may follow different growth paths. Conditions (2) - (4) refer to the quantities hired and
produced by the ﬁrms on the equilibrium path of the *SPNE. This implies that unilateral deviations not only
are not proﬁtable but also they do not affect the equilibrium prices for output and promoted workers, which is
consistent with the competitive hypothesis. Conditions (2) - (3) state that in an IE both the output as well as
the skilled labor market clears. In the market of skilled labor, the supply is given by the sum of those workers
who are offered a promotion but chose to leave to another ﬁrm. Since training is costly, in any *SPNE, those
workers that are offered promotion receive a wage offer that induce them to stay with their previous employer.
Hence, in an IE, the supply of externally trained workers is zero. Condition (3) says that the quantity demanded
of externally trained workers, − → e i
t, equals the quantity supplied. Finally, the last condition guarantees that when
ve
t > w2, some ﬁrm in this industry is willing to pay ve
t to hire a worker promoted by another ﬁrm. Notice
that the derivative in condition (4) takes into account that because the ﬁrm faces a ﬁnancial capital constraint, a
marginal increase in et implies a reduction on the use of some input at date t.
Since workers perform the second task only when old, the requirement that their strategy is part of a *SPNE
of Γ(P,V,α) implies that they accept any wage offer which is greater or equal than ve
t, and reject any offer
below that level. In case of indifference, I assume that an old worker prefers to stay in the ﬁr mw h e r eh ew o r k e d
when young. Therefore, in any *SPNE the old workers’ strategy is:
b σ2,t =
½
A if vt ≥ ve
t
R if vt <v e
t
and for the rest of the paper, I assume that {b σ2,t}
∞
t=0 describes the behavior of the old workers in a *SPNE. The
set of stationary, or history independent, strategies for the workers is:
W =
n








∀t ≥ 0 and ∀ht,e ht ∈ Ht
o
3.1 Prospects for advancement
Since in the early stages of the evolution of an industry ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained, those that pay
lower wages can produce more and obtain more revenues to ﬁnance expansion. Therefore, in order to explain
the outcome of industry evolution, it is important to identify what enables one ﬁrm to hire workers at lower
wages than another. Insofar worker’s abilities are, at least to some degree, ﬁrm speciﬁc and developed by
on-the-job training, one would expect that his reservation wage depends not only on his opportunity cost and
future wages, but also on other factors such as his expectations about the opportunities for promotion within the
ﬁrm. For the moment, I will be rather vague and call all those relevant factors “the prospects for advancement”
15displayed by the ﬁrm. Although intuition suggests that prospects for advancement depends on many factors, I
believe that in this model the following deﬁnition captures the main idea:
Deﬁnition 3.2 A worker believes that ﬁrm i displays better prospect for advancement than ﬁrm j if he is
w i l l i n gt ow o r ki nﬁrm i at a lower wage than in ﬁrm j.
The relevant question is: what aspects of the ﬁrms’ strategies make workers believe that one ﬁrm displays
better prospects for advancement than another? I show that in an IE, ceteris paribus,o n eﬁrm displays better
prospects for advancement than another at date t if and only if workers believe that the former will promote a
larger fraction of its employees than the latter at t +1 . To see why, let’s consider the case of a young worker
born at date t who believes that he will be promoted at date t +1with probability πt.L e tvt+1 > w2 be the
wage, or utility, he anticipates in case of being promoted. If he receives a wage offer wt at date t and he accepts
to join the ﬁrm, his lifetime expected utility is wt + β · [πt · (vt+1 − w2)+w2]. Otherwise, his lifetime utility
is w1 + β · w2. It is not difﬁcult to obtain the wage offer, w(πt,v t+1), which makes the worker indifferent
between accepting a job at date t or not, i.e the reservation entry-wage. Clearly, w(πt,v t+1) must be the unique
solution to the following equation in w:
w + β · [πt · (vt+1 − w2)+w2]=w1 + β · w2
and it follows that the reservation entry-wage is:
w(πt,v t+1)=w1 − β · πt · (vt+1 − w2)
As one could expect, ceteris paribus, workers are willing to work at a lower entry-wage in ﬁrms that are










be an IE. If − → v L
t+1 = − → v H
t+1 > w2,t h eﬁrm that follows
strategy fH displays better prospects for advancement at date t than the ﬁrm that follows fL does iff − → π H
t >
− → π L
t .
3.2 The outside value of a promoted worker
I na nI E ,a n yw o r k e rw h oi so f f e r e dp r o m o t i o ni sf r e et om o v et oa n o t h e rﬁrm where he obtains utility ve
t.I f
young workers follow a strategy that do not depend on the history of play, ﬁrms have no incentive to pay to a
promoted worker more than his reservation utility, ve
t. Therefore, the reservation utility of a promoted worker
is determined either by his wage in another industry or by what the ﬁrms in this industry are willing to pay to a
high ability worker trained by another ﬁrm.
16Since any old worker can work in another industry when old and obtain w2 then ve
t ≥ w2 for all t ≥ 0.
However, the best option of a promoted worker need not be to move out of the industry but to work for a
competitor of the ﬁrm that trained him. In that case, condition (3) in the deﬁnition of an IE implies that ve
t
must be equal to the competitors’ value of an externally trained worker. If those ﬁrms pay ve
t to their internally
promoted workers, and workers follow history independent strategies, the value of an internally promoted
worker is at least ve
t + c. Since a worker promoted internally is, roughly speaking, as productive as 1+θ
workers trained by another ﬁrm then the value of the latter is at least
ve
t+c




1+θ . In the case
in which ve




1+θ or, equivalently, ve
t = c
θ.
One concludes that in any IE in which workers follow stationary strategies, ve




≡ v∗.L e tV ∗
denotes the sequence with elements ve
t = v∗ for all t ≥ 0.
4. ∗-SUBGAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, I consider the game which describes the interaction between a ﬁrm with technology α and
the inﬁnite generations of workers, Γ(P,V ∗,α), in isolation. I divide the analysis in two cases according to the
value of v∗. For each case, I restrict the analysis to a set of price sequences Σ that is the natural candidate to
contain an IE price sequence and analyze the existence of a *SPNE of the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) for those P ∈ Σ.
For the rest of the paper I assume that young workers follow a stationary strategy. Therefore, ﬁrms have no
incentive to offer a promoted worker more than what its competitors would pay. As I argued in the previous
section, in an IE the outside value of a promoted worker must be given by the sequence V ∗. Anticipating this,





= w(πt,v∗) and depends on πt if and
only if v∗ > w2. Whenever v∗ = w2, the optimal strategy of the ﬁrm is the solution to a one agent problem
and, therefore, easier to analyze than the case in which v∗ > w2.S i n c e v∗ = w2 i fa n do n l yi fc
θ ≤ w2,I
consider ﬁrst the simplest case in which c
θ ≤ w2 and later the case c
θ > w2.
4.1 Case I: c
θ ≤ w2 = v∗
Since young workers receive w2 when old, regardless where they work in the future, their reservation entry-




A if wt ≥ w1
R if wt < w1
Given the young workers’ strategy, the ﬁrm has no incentive to offer its workers more than w1 when young and
w2 when old, as in a Walrasian equilibrium. The determination of the optimal ﬁnancial capital and the number







βk+1 · Rk · ak
s.t.

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mk + bk = ak, ak+1 = Rk · ak
(lk,s k,e k,m k,b k) ∈ <5
+, sk ≤ λ · lk−1
Thesolutiontothisproblemdepends, amongotherthings, onthesequenceP. Insteadofsolvingtheproblem
for each possible sequence P, I restrict myself to a set whose elements share some natural properties that makes
them a candidate for an IE price sequence. Whenever proﬁts are positive, the economic intuition suggests that
ﬁrms fully reinvest earnings to hire inputs. Although the behavior of each ﬁrm in isolation does not affect
the output price, the decision of fully reinvesting earnings, taken by all of them together, eventually drives the
price down. If this is so, the growth rate of the aggregate ﬁnancial capital is necessarily larger than one, which
suggests that proﬁts must be driven down to zero in ﬁnite time. Since the purpose of this paper is to analyze the
convergence to a Walrasian-like equilibria, it seems natural to consider those price sequences in the set
Σ = {P ∈ <∞ : ∃ T such that pt <p t−1 ∀t ≤ T and pt = p∗ ∀t ≥ T}
of decreasing price sequences that converge in ﬁnite time to p∗, the socially optimal marginal cost of the good.
From date T on, the ﬁrm can make at most zero proﬁts. Since the ﬁrm can make zero proﬁts by allocating
all assets to the bond, it follows that the problem above has value
βr
1−βr · aT from date T on. Therefore, for any
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mk + bk = ak, ak+1 = Rk · ak
(lk,s k,e k,m k,b k) ∈ <5
+, sk ≤ λ · lk−1
(3)
In general, the optimal strategy of the ﬁrm depends on the history of play not only through at but also
through lt−1, making it difﬁcult to ﬁnd a closed form solution. However, the case in which c
θ = w2 is easy to
analyze because the cost of producing one unit of task 2 does not depend on whether the ﬁrm employs workers
18promoted internally or workers trained by another ﬁrm. This is because c
θ = w2 ⇔ w2 + c = w2 · (1 + θ).
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s payoff depends only on the number of workers performing task 2, st + et
1+θ. Hence,
one can solve the problem above for
n³




ignoring the internal labor market constraint
a n dt h e ns e tst and et so that the constraint is satisﬁed. But once the labor market constraint is not taken into
account, the problem of maximizing the intertemporal sum of discounted proﬁts is equivalent to a sequence of
one period problems. Indeed, the ﬁrm must hire workers to maximize one period proﬁts subject to the ﬁnancial
capital constraint and fully allocate its assets as ﬁnancial capital up to date T − 1. One optimal strategy is
f (T,δ;α,P), which consists in offering wages wt = w1 to the young workers, vt = w2 to the old workers and






δ · at if t = T















· mt,λ · lt−1
¸
where δ ∈ [0,1] and bt = at − mt.
Proposition 4.1 Let p ∈ Σ and c
θ = w2. For any δ ∈ [0,1] and T ≥ Ts, [f (T,δ;α,P),σs] is a *SPNE of









∂et =0 , − → q t = r
p∗ ·− → mt for all t ≥ 0, − → m0 = a0
and









p∗ · r · − → mT−1
´
if t = T
− → mT if t>T
(4)
The upper bound on the date zero price in Proposition 4.1 ensures that the internal labor market constraint
is not binding at date zero. From Proposition 4.1, it is clear that the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) does not have a unique
*SPNE. Indeed, the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) has two sources of multiplicity. However, neither of them result in an
IE where identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths towards the steady state. I show in section 5 that market
clearing in the output and labor market as well as the requirement that ﬁnancial capital stays constant after date
T helps to eliminate all but one of those *SPNE.
First, since the relative cost of a promoted worker and a worker trained by another ﬁrm equals their con-
stant marginal rate of technical substitution, then the ﬁrm is indifferent between these two inputs. Strategy
f (T,δ,α,P)assumesthatst = Min
h
1−α
w2+c · mt,λ · lt−1
i





w2+c · mt,λ · lt−1
i´
is also a best response to the workers’ strategy and implies that et > 0. However, this multiplicity is only rele-
vant when one analyzes a single ﬁrm in isolation. In any IE, instead, market clearing implies that no ﬁrm hires
19an externally trained workers. Therefore, one cannot generate heterogeneous growth paths by assuming that
some ﬁrms only promote internally and the rest promote both internally and externally because − → e i
t =0for ev-
ery ﬁrm i. Second, there is a continuum of *SPNE of the type [f (T,δ;α,P),σs] indexed by δ ∈ [0,1].T h e s e
equilibria differ only in the ﬁn a n c i a lc a p i t a la td a t eT and arise because the scale of the ﬁrm is indeterminate
once proﬁts are driven down to zero. This feature of the model causes the existence of multiple *SPNE that dif-
fer only in the level of ﬁnancial capital after date T. One could even ﬁnd a *SPNE in which the ﬁrms behave
according to f (T,δ;α,P) up to date T but the ﬁnancial capital does not stay constant afterwards. However,
in all those *SPNE the behavior of the ﬁrm before date T is identical and, therefore, cannot be used to explain
why ex-ante identical ﬁrms may follow different growth paths before proﬁt sa r ed r i v e nd o w nt oz e r o .
The hypothesis of Proposition 4.1 states that c
θ = w2.I fc
θ < w2, instead, to produce one unit of task 2
using externally promoted workers is more expensive than employing internally promoted workers. Therefore,
there are some partial histories where the internal labor market constraint is binding but, nevertheless, it is
still optimal not to hire workers trained by another ﬁrm. In addition, it may be optimal to produce even if the
shortage in the internal labor market drives the ﬁrm’s current proﬁts below zero, provided the ﬁrm expects to
make sufﬁciently high positive proﬁts in the future. Hence the optimal level of ﬁnancial capital depends not
only on whether proﬁts are positive or not in the future, but also on the present discounted value of those proﬁts
and the number of workers currently available for promotion. For these reasons, it is more difﬁcult to describe
explicitly the strategy of the ﬁrm. I show that there exists a *SPNE and that it is qualitatively similar to the
*SPNE found for the case v∗ = w2.I na n y* S P N E ,{(lk,s k,e k,m k,b k)}
T−1
k=t is the unique solution to (3) at
every date t ≤ T − 1. In addition, it is also true that in any *SPNE, − → e t =0 , − → q t = r
p∗ · − → mt for all t ≥ 0 and
that (4) holds for all t ≤ T.
Proposition 4.2 Let p ∈ Σ and c





w1 · λ and




∂et < 0, − → q t = r
p∗ · − → mt for all
t ≥ 0 and there exists δ ∈ [0,1] such that (4) holds for all t ≤ T.
In the equilibrium path of the *SPNE found in this section, ﬁrms promote workers internally, the value of
these workers’ marginal productivity is above their wage and once the training cost is sunk, every ﬁrm strictly
prefers a worker promoted internally rather than one trained in another ﬁrm. Therefore, these *SPNE of the
game describe the behavior of ﬁrms that set up a closed internal labor market with one entry port and an up or
out promotion system.
4.2 Case II: v∗ = c
θ > w2
As it happens when c
θ = w2, it costs the same to produce one unit of the second task either employing
internally promoted workers or hiring externally trained workers. Unlike when c
θ = w2, the promotion policy of
20the ﬁrm does affect the reservation entry-wage when c
θ > w2. Although how much to invest as ﬁnancial capital
is part of the strategic decision that the ﬁrm makes, to simplify the exposition, it is useful to start describing a
strategy for a ﬁxed sequence of ﬁnancial capital. As I show in Proposition 4.3, this is meaningful because in
any *SPNE in which workers follow a stationary strategy there is a common linear relationship between the
number of workers hired and the level of the ﬁnancial capital of the ﬁrm. After describing this relationship, I
deﬁne a set of output price sequences and I argue that it is the natural candidate to contain the equilibrium price
sequences. For those sequences, I study the optimal reinvestment strategy of the ﬁrm and show that for some
parameters values there exists two kinds of *SPNE of the game played by the inﬁnite generations of workers
and the ﬁrm.
Initially, I consider an exogenous strategy {mt}
∞
t=0 for the allocation of assets between ﬁnancial capital
and bonds. Suppose the ﬁrm spends a fraction α of its ﬁnancial capital to hire young workers, to perform
the ﬁrst task, and a fraction 1 − α to hire workers, to perform the second task. This ﬁrm offers wages
wt to lt = α
wt · mt young workers and v∗ to st =m i n
n
λ · lt−1, 1−α
v∗+c · mt
o




v∗ · mt − (1 + θ) · st
ª
workers trained by another ﬁrm. Therefore, the production level of the ﬁrm,











Hence, for any wage wt that induces young workers to accept employment, the ﬁrm produces q(wt,α) · mt.









mt then wt is the reservation entry-wage if
and only if it is the solution to the equation:









· (v∗ − w2) (5)
Solving for wt, one can write the reservation entry-wage as a function of the ﬁnancial capital growth rate.
Lemma 4.1 For any g ≥ 0, the equation w = w1 − β · 1−α
α · w
v∗+c · g · (v∗ − w2) has a unique solution
ω : <+ × (0,1) 7→ [0,w1] given by
ω(g,α)=
α · (v∗ + c) · w1
α · (v∗ + c)+( 1− α) · β · (v∗ − w2) · g
The function ω is continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing in g.
There are two levels of the reservation entry-wage that are key in this paper: the reservation entry-wage
associated with an stationary level of ﬁnancial capital, ω(1,α),a n dt h ereservation entry-wage associated with
21ag r o w t hr a t eo fr, ω(r,α). For each of these wages, one can deﬁne the output price such that the ﬁrm’s rate of
return is r, i.e. the price which is equal to the ﬁrm’s marginal cost. This is stated in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let ps (α) ≡ r
q(w(1,α),α) and pr (α) ≡ r
q(w(r,α),α).
The following assumption ensures that for any g ≥ 0, the promotion rate 1−α
α ·
ω(g,α)
v∗+c · g is bounded above
by λ.
Assumption AW: Assume w1, w2, β,a n dc




Assumption AW says that promotion brings about a welfare change that is large; so large that if workers
believed that the promotion probability were high enough and the wage of a promoted worker were c
θ,t h e y
w o u l dw o r kf o rf r e ei nﬁrm i when young. The assumption that reservation entry-wages are not bounded away
from zero is sufﬁcient to show the existence of an IE. However, as it is shown below, equilibrium entry-wages
are uniformly bounded away from zero because the internal labor market constraint does not bind. I postpone
further interpretations about the role of this assumption until I complete the description of the workers’ and
ﬁrms’ strategies in an IE.
If workers follow a stationary strategy, the ﬁrm must allocate its ﬁnancial capital as if it were maximizing
one period proﬁts subject to a ﬁnancial constraint. That is for any ht ∈ Ht, (lt,s t,e t,w t,v t) must solve











w · l +( v + c) · s + v · e = mt





This property of a *SPNE is proved in Proposition 4.3, where I also argue that the solution to problem (6) is to
allocate the ﬁnancial capital as described by (7) - (9).
Proposition 4.3 Suppose (f,σ) ∈ F×W is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α).I fmt > 0, then












, st + et = 1−α
v∗+c · mt (9)
In addition, if st = Min
n
1−α
v∗+c · mt,λ · lt−1
o






As in the case in which c






because they imply that − → e t > 0, which violates condition (3) in the deﬁnition of an IE. Therefore, I restrict my
22attention to those *SPNE in which st = Min
n
1−α
v∗+c · mt,λ · lt−1
o
. So far, I have considered an exogenous
sequence of ﬁnancial capital. However, how much to invest in the ﬁrm is one of the key decisions taken by
the ﬁrms. Suppose the ﬁrm reinvests all earnings at date t +1 , that is
mt+1
mt = pt · q(wt,α).T h e n ,wt is the
reservation entry-wage if and only if wt i sas o l u t i o nt ot h ef o l l o w i n ge q u a t i o ni nw:






· pt · q(w,α) · (v∗ − w2) (10)
The existence of a wage offer that solves (10) is discussed in Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.2 If assumption AW holds, there exists a unique ωH : <+ × (0,1) → [0,w1] that solves (10). The
function ωH is continuous and strictly decreasing in p.
Intuition suggests that in the presence of ﬁnancial constraints and no ﬁxed costs, the early stages of the
process of industry evolution are characterized by a relatively high output price and positive proﬁts. This
induces ﬁrms to fully reinvest their earnings, driving down the price of output until proﬁts vanish. It seems
natural to think that the industry eventually converges to a steady state where all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts and
ﬁnancial capital stays constant. If this intuition is correct and ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, Proposition 4.3
implies that in any IE the young workers’ wage and the output price should converge to ω(1,α) and ps (α),
respectively.7 Thus, the stationary level of aggregate ﬁnancial capital should be
ps·D(ps)
r , so that all active ﬁrms
make zero proﬁts at the price ps.I fﬁrms fully reinvest earnings along the transition to the steady state, its rate









>ror equivalently pt >p r (α). Thus, in order to show the existence of an IE, and with
some abuse of notation, it seems natural to restrict the search to sequences of prices in the set
Σ = {P ∈ <∞ : ∃ Ts such that pt >p r, ∀t<T s and pt = ps, ∀t ≥ Ts}
and for any P ∈ Σ,l e tPt = {pτ}
∞
τ=t.
For any P ∈ Σ, consider the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) and the following family of cut-off strategies for the young





A if wt ≥ ωH (pt,α) and t<T− 1
A if wt ≥ ωH (δ · pT−1,α) and t = T − 1
A if wt ≥ ω(1,α) and t ≥ T
R otherwise
The cut-off wage coincides with the reservation entry-wage of a worker who assumes that the ﬁrm reinvests
all its assets as ﬁnancial capital up to T − 1, it reinvest only a fraction δ of its assets at date T ≥ Ts and that
7 Observe that ps (α) is the ﬁrm’s marginal cost when it pays ω (1,α) to its young workers.
23the ﬁnancial capital is constant and equal to mT thereafter. According to strategy σ1,t, a young worker accepts




Abusing notation, let f (T,δ;α,P) be the strategy in which (7) - (9) holds, st = Min
n
1−α








δ · aT if t = T





ωH (pt,α) if t<T− 1
ωH (δ · pT−1,α) if t = T − 1
ω(1,α) if t ≥ T
where δ ∈ [0,1] and T ≥ Ts. According to this strategy, the ﬁrm offers a wage equal to the cutoff value of
strategy σ(T,δ;α,P) (i.e. (wt,v t) ∈ Min Θ(σ
¯ ¯ht)) and spends its ﬁnancial capital as if it were maximiz-
i n gs h o r tr u nc o n s t r a i n e dp r o ﬁts. As the following proposition shows, these strategies constitute a *SPNE of
Γ(P,V ∗,α) for an open set of output price sequences in Σ.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose c
θ > w2.L e tP ∈ Σ, δ ∈ [0,1] and T ≥ Ts.I fpT−1 · q
¡
ωH (δ · pT−1,α),α
¢
>r ,





all t ≥ 0.
As in the previous section, there is a continuum of *SPNE of the type [f (T,δ,α,P),σ (T,δ;α,P)] indexed
by δ ∈ [0,1]. However, I show in the next section that in any IE,i fc
θ > w2 then the value of δ is uniquely
determined by the output market clearing condition.
NowI amina better positionto explain the role of assumption AW. Alongthe process of industry evolution,
there are potentially two limits to the growth of ﬁrms. On the one hand, ﬁrms might not achieve their optimal
size because they do not have enough ﬁnancial capital to ﬁnance expansion. This is represented by the ﬁnancial
capital constraint described by (1). On the other hand, ﬁrms may face a shortage in their internal labor market.
That is, even if ﬁnancial capital were available to promote workers, the internal pool might not contain as many
high ability candidates as workers the ﬁrm would like to hire. This is the constraint imposed by the internal
labor market and expressed by (2). In principle, any of this two constraints may be binding during the process
of industry evolution. On the one hand, the possibility that a shortage in the ﬁrm’s internal labor markets can be
responsible for the slow growth of an industry is very realistic but, on the other hand, it complicates the analysis
enormously. I introduced assumption AW to rule out this possibility along the equilibrium path of any *SPNE
of the type [f (T,δ;α,P),σ (T,δ;α,P)].
The *SPNE [f (T,δ;α,P),σ (T,δ;α,P)] corresponds to a situation where workers are optimistic about the
prospects for advancement offered by the ﬁrm. However, the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) has another type of *SPNE;
it corresponds to the case in which prospects for advancement within the ﬁrm are not so favorable. In this
*SPNE, reservation entry-wages are such that the ﬁrm can just make zero proﬁts from date 1 on. For that ﬁrm
24it is (weakly) optimal to reduce its ﬁnancial capital along time, which justiﬁes the workers’ pessimism about








.L e tp∗∗ (α)= r
q(w1,α) be the marginal
cost of a ﬁrm that is expected to close the following period, i.e. w1 = ω(0,α). If the output price were higher
than p∗∗, workers would expect negative growth from ﬁrms that follow strategy fL but this is not feasible since
ﬁnancial capital is non-negative. For any w0 ∈ (w,w),d e ﬁne the collection of young workers’ strategies as
σ (w0;α,P)={σ1,t (w0;α,P),b σ2,t}
∞





A if wt ≥ w0 and t =0
A if wt ≥ ωL (pt,α) and t ≥ 1
R otherwise
LetGbetheinverseofω(g,α). Thestrategyf (w0,a 0;α,P),isgi v enby(7)-(9),st = Min
n
1−α







a0 if t =0





· at−1 if t ≥ 2
wt =
½
w0 if t =0
ωL (pt,α) if t ≥ 1
Unlike the *SPNE [f (T,δ;α,P),σ (T,δ;α,P)],a ta n yd a t et ≥ 1 the ﬁrm is indifferent about how much
to allocate as ﬁnancial capital if the workers follow σ (w0;α,P). Therefore, the ﬁnancial capital of the ﬁrm at
t +1can be chosen to justify the young worker’s reservation entry-wage at date t.
Proposition 4.5 Suppose c
θ > w2.L e tP ∈ Σ and w0 ∈ (w,w).I fpt ≤ p∗∗ (α) for all t ≥ 1, then the strategy
proﬁle [f (w0,a 0;α,P),σ (w0;α,P)] is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α) in which − → e t =0and
∂Π(f(·),σ(·);α|
− → ht )
∂et =0
for all t ≥ 0.
Each *SPNE in Proposition 4.5 differs from those found in Proposition 4.4 in the behavior of the ﬁrm along
the transition to the steady state. This opens the possibility that ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth
paths. However, since ωL (ps,α)=ω(1,α), in both *SPNE the worker’s reservation entry-wage converges to
the same level at date T. Hence, ﬁrms following strategies f (T,δ;α,P) and f (w0,a 0;α,P) stop growing and
face the same price for labor from date T on. Any difference in their steady state size must originate during the
transition towards the stationary state.
At this point, the reader may wonder whether the *SPNE discussed above describe all possible behaviors
of ﬁrms and workers for a given P ∈ Σ. One can show that in any *SPNE of the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) in which





(f,σ) consists in playing (7) - (9), st = Min
n
1−α
v∗+c · mt,λ · lt−1
o
, mt = at and wt = ωH (pt,α) for all t<τ
and according to [ft−τ (w,aτ;α,Pτ),σt−τ (w;α,Pτ)] for all t ≥ τ. Therefore, the two *SPNE analyzed
in Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 are the special cases in which τ ≥ Ts and τ =0 , respectively. I prove here a
weaker result that characterizes the *SPNE wages when young workers follow stationary strategies and the
ﬁrm’s demand for externally trained workers is zero on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 4.6 Let P ∈ Σ and c
θ > w2. Suppose (f,σ) ∈ F×W is a *SPNE in which − → e t =0 .I f





[ft−τ (− → w τ,a τ;α,Pτ),σt−τ (− → w τ;α,Pτ)] for all t ≥ τ.
What this proposition says is that in any *SPNE the young workers’ reservation entry wage can differ from
ωH (pt,α) or ωL (pt,α) for at most one period. Moreover, once the reservation wage equals ωL (pτ,α) for
some generation τ, the reservation entry-wage of those generations born at t ≥ τ is ωL (pt,α). That is, once a
ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts for the ﬁrst time, it cannot obtain positive proﬁts thereafter.
Like in the previous case, in the equilibrium path of these *SPNE, ﬁrms promote workers internally, the
value of these workers’ marginal productivity is above their wage and, once the training cost is sunk, every ﬁrm
strictly prefers a worker promoted internally rather than one trained in another ﬁrm. Moreover, if c
θ > w2 then
the wage of old workers is always above the wage they would receive in another industry. Hence, small changes
in market conditions (i.e. changes in w2) do not affect the wage of skilled workers. Therefore, each *SPNE of
the game describe the behavior of ﬁrms that set up a closed internal labor market with one entry port and an up
or out promotion system.
5. EX ANTE IDENTICAL FIRMS
In this section, I consider an industry in which ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, i.e. αj = α for all j ∈ [0,1].
First, I analyze two benchmark cases: in section 5.1, I analyze an equilibrium where ﬁrms face no ﬁnancial
constraint from the start and in section 5.2, I consider the case in which ﬁnancial constraints are binding at date
zero but v∗ = w2, i.e. skills are speciﬁc enough or training cost low enough so that competition for skilled
workers do not drive the market value of a promoted workers above its opportunity cost in another industry. I
show there exists a unique industry equilibrium and that it converges to an allocatively efﬁcient steady state in
ﬁnite time. Section 5.3, turns into the more interesting scenario where the internal labor market is an implicit
contractenforcedbymarketcompetition, thatis, whenv∗ > w2. Aminimal requirement fora model ofindustry
evolution is to have an equilibrium in which ex-ante identical ﬁrms behave identically. In section 5.3.1, I show
that such equilibrium always exist and converges to a Walrasian-like state in ﬁnite time. I also discuss its
efﬁciency properties. In section 5.3.2, I show that it also exists an open set of equilibria where ex-ante identical
26ﬁrms follow different growth paths. In these equilibria, productive efﬁciency holds but allocative efﬁciency
fails during the transition towards the steady state.
5.1 Perfect Credit Markets
If the market for credit is perfect, entrepreneurs are not restricted to their own assets to ﬁnance production.
Therefore, proﬁts are driven down to zero from the start. Let Ps be the sequence with pt = ps for all t ≥ 0.
Clearly, Ps ∈ Σ.S i n c e ﬁrms must make zero proﬁts, then the output per unit of ﬁnancial capital must be
r
ps every period. Hence, the workers’ reservation entry-wage is ω(1,α) every period and the market clears
if and only if the aggregate ﬁnancial capital is
ps·D(ps)
r every period. The industry output level is D(ps).I f
v∗ = w2,t h e nps = p∗ and allocative efﬁciency holds. Otherwise, too little is produced with respect to the
efﬁcient allocation (i.e. ps >p ∗) but technological efﬁciency necessarily holds because every ﬁrm pays the
same wages, ω(1,α) and v∗, and maximize proﬁts. It follows that, in the presence of a perfect credit market,
ex-ante identical ﬁrms produce the same every period and workers that perform the same task receive the same
wage regardless of the ﬁrm that employs them. To understand why too little is produced when v∗ > w2, notice
that the marginal cost in that case is ps (α)= r
q(ω(1,α),α) while the marginal cost in the efﬁcient allocation is
p∗ = r










is the solution to
Maxlα · s1−α
s.t. w1 · l +( w2 + c) · s ≤ 1
The two marginal costs are equal if and only if v∗ = w2 so that ω(1,α)=w1.S o i t s u f ﬁces to argue
that when v∗ > w2, production per unit of ﬁnancial capital is smaller than in the efﬁcient allocation, i.e.
q(ω(1,α),α) <q ∗. The answer is not trivial because as v∗ increases, the wage of young workers decreases.
However, since workers discount the future at rate β, each unit increase in v∗ leads to a less than proportional
reduction in ω(1,α). Indeed, let ls and ss be the number of young and skilled workers, respectively, hired
when v∗ > w2.S i n c eω(1,α)=w1 − β · ss
ls · (v∗ − w2) it follows that if β ∈ (0,1) then
1=ω(1,α) · ls +( v∗ + c) · ss = w1 · ls +[ ( 1− β) · v∗ + β · w2 + c] · ss
> w1 · ls +( w2 + c) · ss
which implies that q∗ >q(ω(1,α),α).
Remark 1: The argument above shows that the lack of allocative efﬁciency in the steady state does not
depend on the assumption that ﬁrms have no access to credit. What is really important is whether skills are
general enough or training is so costly that the market value of a promoted worker is above w2. Therefore, one
concludes that it is the impossibility of enforcing a long term contract in which an old worker is paid w2 what
is at the root of the lack of allocative efﬁciency.
27Remark 2: Since the industry attains the steady state from the start, there is no evolution when credit
markets are perfect. Therefore, one cannot talk about the growth path of a ﬁrm and how the prospects for
advancement displayed by the ﬁrm affects its steady state size.
For the rest of the paper I assume that the initial ﬁnancial capital falls short of the steady state level , i.e.
0 <a 0 <
ps·D(ps)
r .
5.2 Case I: c
θ ≤ w2
This case corresponds to a situation in which workers anticipate that ﬁrms have no incentives to pay an old
worker more than what ﬁrms in another industry would pay. The young worker’s reservation entry-wage is
independent of the ﬁrm’s strategy. That is, ω(g,α)=w1 for all g ≥ 0 and ps = pr = p∗.A sw a ss h o w ni n
Proposition4.2, inany*SPNEofthegameΓ(P,V ∗,α)workers followstrategyσs, − → e t =0 ,
∂Π(f,σs;α|
− → ht )
∂et ≤ 0
and ﬁrms produce r
p∗ · − → mt at every date t ≥ 0. To show that an IE actually exists, is sufﬁces to ﬁnd a price
sequence P ∈ Σ such that the output market clears at every date t ≥ 0. If such a sequence exists, then for any
t<Tit must be the case that pt solves
r
p∗ · − → a t = D(pt)





is well deﬁned and strictly
decreasing for any 0 ≤ a ≤
p∗·D(p∗)

























p∗ >r ,t h e r ee x i s t sad a t eT ≥ 1 such that xt <
p∗·D(p∗)
r
for all t<Tand xt =
p∗·D(p∗)






















p∗ if t ≥ T
and letb δ =
p∗·D(p∗)
r·pT−1·D(pT−1) ∈ [0,1]. Clearly, P is in Σ and it is strictly decreasing up to date T. It is the sequence
of market clearing prices when the aggregate ﬁnancial capital of the ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y{xt}
∞
t=0. As the following
proposition shows, it is also an IE price sequence. The key is to show that {xt}
∞
t=0 describes the evolution of
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial capital on the equilibrium path of Γ(P,V ∗,α).
Proposition 5.1 If c










,t h e na nI Ee x i s t s .
28In the IE described in proposition 5.1, each ﬁrm pays wages w1 and w2 to its young and old workers,
respectively. Each ﬁrm fully reinvest its revenue as ﬁnancial capital, growing at rate
pt





p∗ · r skilled workers up to date T − 1. The growth process stops at date T,w h e np r o ﬁts are
driven down to zero. From date T on, all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts and workers performing identical jobs receive
the same wage, regardless of the ﬁrm that hires them, as in a Walrasian equilibrium. Hence, from the positive
point of view, the industry attains a Walrasian-like equilibrium. Although technological efﬁciency holds at
every date t, allocative efﬁciency may not be attained from the start because the ﬁnancial constraint prevents
the industry to produce Q∗ at the early stages. Nevertheless, from date T on the industry output is Q∗ and
allocative efﬁciency is also achieved. Finally, if workers follow stationary strategies and output prices are in Σ,
Corollary 5.1 shows that in any IE, ex ante identical ﬁrms must follow the same growth path towards the steady
state. As I show in the next section, this need not be the case if c
θ > w2.






in which b σ ∈ W and b P ∈ Σ, then b σ = σs, b P = P and
− →
b f t = − → f t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
5.3 Case II: c
θ > w2
This section analyzes the scenario in which ﬁrms have an incentive to pay an old worker more than what
ﬁrms in another industry would pay. Hence, the young worker’s reservation entry-wage depends on the strategy
of the ﬁrm that contacts him. As I proved in section 4, the game between the workers and the ﬁrms has two
types of *SPNE. In section 5.3.1, I show that there is a unique IE where all ﬁrms display identical prospects for
advancement. It corresponds toﬁrms and workers behavingaccording toone of the optimistic *SPNEdescribed
before. In section 5.3.2, I show that there is an open set of IE in which some ﬁrms display better prospects for
advancement than others and follow different growth paths towards the steady state.














for some P ∈ Σ, T ≥ Ts and b δ ∈ [0,1], i.e. µH =1 . In this section, to simplify notation, I omit the parame-
ter α in the functions q, ω and ωH.F r o md a t eT on, the wage offered by the ﬁrms and accepted by the workers
is ω(1) and total supply is q(ω(1)) · − → mT.S i n c ept = ps for all t ≥ T, the only unknowns are the prices that
clear the market along the transition towards the steady state, that is the sequence {pt}
T−1
t=0 . Market clearing at
date T implies that − → mH
T =
ps·D(ps)
r . It follows that − → w T−1 = ωH
³


















· − → mH
T−1 = D(pT−1) (11)
and b δ =
ps·D(ps)
r·pT−1·D(pT−1).
29If T =1 , then (11) completely describes the output prices along the transition to the stationary state. If





· − → mt = D(p) ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2 (12)
Lemma 5.1 Suppose assumptions AD and AW holds and c
θ > w2.I fm ≤
ps·D(ps)















and P(m) >p r if and only if m<
pr·D(pr)
r .
If T>1, it follows from Lemma 5.1 that p0 = P(a0). One concludes that for any T ≥ 1,t h ew o r k e r s ’





if T =1and − → w 0 = ωH (P(a0))
whenever T>1. In addition, conditions (11) and (12) make it clear that at any date t ≤ T − 1, prices and
entry-wages depend only on the aggregate ﬁnancial capital . Since − → mt = pt−1 · q(− → w t−1) · − → mt−1 for all





, there is at most one equilibrium sequence of prices in Σ.
In order to prove the existence of an IE, I construct a sequence P ∈ Σ by iterating the map P until the ﬁrst
date that full reinvestment of revenues would make the aggregate ﬁnancial capital larger than the stationary
level. That date is the candidate for date T − 1; to complete the sequence {pt}
T−1
t=0 , I choose pT−1 to be the
solution of (11) given the value of − → mT−1.8
Proposition 5.2 ThereisauniqueIEinwhichP ∈ Σ,µH =1and
¡
fH,σH¢
=[ f (T,δ;α,P),σ (T,δ;α,P)]
for some T ≥ Ts and δ ∈ [0,1].
One concludes that in the unique IEin which allﬁrms follow the same growth path, technological efﬁciency
holds because all ﬁrms pay the same wages to workers performing identical tasks at every date. Allocative
efﬁciency, however, fails even in the steady state because D(ps) <Q ∗. Since allocative efﬁciency would also
failed if the credit market were perfect but would hold if c
θ ≤ w2, one concludes that it is the impossibility of
enforcing a wage w2 for the old workers rather than the credit constraint what causes the industry production
to fall short of the efﬁcient level in the long run. However, as the following section shows, a credit constraint
is necessary to explain why ex-ante identical ﬁrms can follow different growth paths which result in different
market shares in the long run.
5.3.2 Different growth paths
Now suppose that only a fraction µH ∈ (0,1) of the ﬁrms follow strategy f (T,δ;α,P),f o rs o m eT ≥ Ts
and δ ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, one can analyze how the retained earnings dynamic selects among ﬁrms in the
presence of internal promotions. Proposition 5.3 shows that in any IE with P ∈ Σ,t h o s eﬁrms that display the
8 If pr · D(pr) ≥ ps · D(ps), it can be shown that the equilibrium I ﬁnd is the unique IE with P ∈
P
.
30worst prospects for advancement at date zero, continue to show the worst prospects up to date T. That is, those
ﬁrms that do not play f0 (T,δ;α,P) at date zero must follow a strategy f (w0;α,P) for some w0 ∈ (w,w).
Proposition 5.3 Suppose µH ∈ (0,1).I fwL















. Hence, − → w L
t < − → w H
t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
It follows from Proposition 5.3 that, ceteris paribus, ﬁrms that display better prospects for advancement at
date zero have a higher growth rate along the transition and a higher steady state market share than those ﬁrms
that initially show worse prospects for advancement. Since in any IE − → mi
t+1 = G(− → w t) · − → mi
t, then there is a
monotonic relationship between ﬁnancial capital and prospects for advancement. One concludes that among
ex-ante identical ﬁrms, the retained earning dynamic favors those ﬁrms that, from the workers’ point of view,
display better prospects for advancement at date zero.
I devote the rest of this section to characterize an IE in which ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth







=[ f (w0,a 0;α,P),σ (w0;α,P)].
IfT =1 , thentheaggregateﬁnancialcapitalatdate1is− → mH

























and market clearing at
























































0 = D(p0) w <w L
0 < w (14)
where the left hand side is the short run industry supply function. For any initial level of aggregate ﬁnancial
capital, a0 = aH
0 + aL
0, the assumption that w <w L
0 implies that the industry supply shifts to the left when
compared to the case where all ﬁrms display equal prospects for advancement, i.e. µH =1 . Therefore, there
is an excess of demand at P(a0), the price which solves (14) when µH =1 . Likewise, there is an excess





. Since the date zero supply function is strictly increasing in prices, demand is
















































31The function M turns out to be crucial to determine whether T =1or T>1. Recall from the previous







a ﬁxed µH ∈ (0,1), the following proposition provides the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence
of an IE where T =1and a fraction µH ∈ (0,1) of the ﬁrms follow fH while the others follow fL.












































and p0 solves (13).
Now, consider wL









r ; if there exists an equilibrium with P ∈ Σ,t h e ni t
must be the case that T>1. Since the equilibrium price at date zero must satisfy (14), it follows that








0 < w (15)
Since ﬁrm L must make zero proﬁts at any 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 but wages are bounded above by w1, then output
prices are bounded above by p∗∗ = r
q(w1) , i.e. the marginal cost of a ﬁrm that is expected to close the following










· − → mL
t = D(pt) if 1 ≤ t<T− 1
The left hand side of this equation is the short run industry supply function. For a given level of aggregate
ﬁnancial capital, − → mH
t +− → mL
t , it follows that the short run industry supply shifts to the left compared to the case
in which all ﬁrms follow strategy fH.T h a ti s ,f o ra n yp ≤ P
¡− → mH
























Then, there is an excess of demand at any price p ≤ P
¡− → mH
t + − → mL
t
¢
. Therefore, by assumption AD,f o r
any − → mH
t + − → mL
t <
ps·D(ps)
r there exists e P
¡− → mH





t + − → mL
t
¢
that clears the market. However,
such a price may not be the unique market clearing price. On the one hand, for a ﬁxed level of ﬁnancial
capital, the supply of those ﬁrms which follow strategy fH increases with output price. On the other hand,
the supply of those ﬁrms that play fL decreases with the output price because the young workers’ reservation
entry-wage adjusts so that the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts. As a consequence, total supply can increase or decrease





is strictly increasing and strictly convex in prices, in proposition 5.5 I assume concavity of
p·D(p) to ensure that there is at most one market clearing price exceeding pr. Hence, if − → mH




then the market clearing price is
pt = e P
¡− → mH
t ,− → mL
t
¢
for any 1 ≤ t<T− 1 (16)
32At date T −1, the same reasoning that motivated the necessity of condition (11) implies that the steady state
aggregate ﬁnancial capital must be
ps·D(ps)



























· − → mL
T−1 = D(pT−1) (17)
To show that an IE with µH ∈ (0,1) and T>1 actually exists, choose wL


















































































It follows that xL

























r for the ﬁrst time. The following
proposition shows how to construct a candidate for a price sequence and provides a sufﬁcient condition for the
e x i s t e n c eo fa nI Ei nw h i c hex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths.


























T−1 = D(p) (18)
Let P =
©
ρ0,...,ρT−2, b p,ps,p s,...
ª





0 ∈ (w,w), pt ∈ (pr,p ∗∗] for all



















r implies that T ≥ 2. The concavity assumption ensures









≤ w1. The following example illustrates how to use Propositions 5.4 and 5.5 to
show that there exists an IE associated with some sequence P ∈ Σ.
Example 1: The demand function is D(p)=1
p, which satisﬁes assumption AD, and expenditure is always
equal to 1. This simpliﬁes the analysis because after one period the assets in hand of the ﬁrms exceeds the
steady state ﬁnancial capital. However, when ﬁrms follow different strategies convergence to the steady state
may take more than one period. This is because the assets in hand of those ﬁrms that display good growth
33prospects may fall short of the steady state level at date 1. Suppose
α =0 .5 λ ≥ 0.2 c =1 w1 =0 .2 aH
0 =0 .14
β =9 /10 1
r =0 .9 θ =0 .5 w2 =8 /9 aL
0 =0 .06
For these parameters, assumption AW holds and the steady state wages are ω(1) = 0.15 for the young workers















and T =1 . Young workers receive an entry-wage of 0.08 at date zero and 0.15
thereafter, while the probability of promotion for a young worker is 0.12 at date zero and 0.05 afterwards. The
equilibrium levels of ﬁnancial capital are − → m0 =0 .2 and − → mt =0 .9 for all t ≥ 1.
However, there are other equilibria where, for example, 1/3 of the ﬁrms follow strategy fL while the rest
follows fH. I have chosen the parameters values so that in any IE either T =1or T =2 . The example is robust
to values of µL in an open set of 1
3. Since the equilibrium in which all ﬁrms behave identically converges to a
stationary state at date 1, not surprisingly the same happens if workers believe that prospects for advancement
are not very different. If ﬁrms which follow strategy fL display different prospects for advancement, then
wL
0 > 0.08. Hence, the date zero equilibrium price must be higher than 2
√
6, the market clearing price when






one concludes that, for these parameters, w = w1.F o ra n ywL
0 ∈ (0.08,u],w h e r eu ' 0.105, the right hand

















, by Proposition 5.4 there
is an equilibrium where wL
0 > − → w H
0 and T =1iff p0 solves (13). The left hand side of Figure 2 shows the
unique solution to (13) for each wL
0 ∈ [0.08,u]
0.08









Ts = 1 Ts  = 2
Figure 2. Equilbrium Prices and Aggregate Financial Capital
34For any wL








r. By Proposition 5.4,
if an equilibrium with wL
0 ∈ (u,0.2] exists, it must be the case that T ≥ 2 .S i n c ep · D(p) is concave and
µH = 2
3 ≥ 1 − 1
r = 1
10, then one can use the sufﬁcient conditions in Proposition 5.5 to check whether there
exists an IE with T =2and wL




























































≥ ρ1 to (18) exists. The uniqueness of the solution follows because





















and verify that P = {p0,p 1,p s,p s,...}




T−1) ≤ 1 ⇔ ωH
³
b δ · b p
´






1 =1− r · xL



















b δ · b p
´
. Thus b δ ≤ 1. By Proposition 5.5, for any wL













0 ∈ (u,0.2], ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths. In Figure 3, I show the steady
state market share of ﬁrm’s L and H as a function of the young worker’s entry-wage for ﬁrm L at date zero.
















Figure 3. Steady State Market Shares
35Those ﬁrms that follow fL and display very bad prospects for advancement at date zero are almost driven
o u ta td a t e2, as can be seen on the right hand side of Figure 3. For example, if at date zero the young workers’
reservation entry-wage is larger than 0.18, the steady state market share of the L ﬁr m si ss m a l l e rt h a n1%. ¤
This example showsthatinanIE,ex-ante identicalﬁrms canfollowdifferentgrowthpaths andhave different
sizes in the steady state. Along the transition to the steady state, ﬁrms pay different wages to their young
workers. Therefore, technological efﬁciency only holds in the steady state. My analysis of the cases in which
either the credit market is perfect or v∗ = w2 implies that these results depend both on the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints as well as on the impossibility of enforcing a wage w2 for the skilled workers.
6. HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
In this section, I consider an example in which ﬁrms are endowed with different technologies. In particular,
I assume that αH < αL and a fraction µH ∈ (0,1) of the ﬁrms has technology αH. Firms endowed with
technology αH and αL are called ﬁrms H and L, respectively. Firm H is believed to display better prospects
for advancement than ﬁrm L at date zero. I show that if the young workers born at zero are pessimistic enough
about the prospects displayed by ﬁrm L, ﬁrm H may end up dominating the market even though it produces
inefﬁciently.
With some abuse of notation, let q(l,s,0;αi)=q(l,s;αi). Since the technology displays CRS, q(l,s;αi)
can be written as q(l,s;αi)=l ·
¡s
l
¢1−αi and the relationship between the two production functions can be





q(L,S;α) =   Η q
q(L,S;α) =   L q
Figure 4. Isoquants of ﬁrms H and L
If in equilibrium the two ﬁrms choose an input bundle that lies below the diagonal, then ﬁrm H produces
inefﬁciently in the sense that ﬁrm L could produce the same output using less of every input. Indeed, for any
36level of inputs l>0 and s>0 such that s
l < 1 it follows that αH < αL
αH < αL ⇔ q(l,s;αL) >q(l,s;αH)





and young workers play





against ﬁrms with technologies αH and αL, respectively. Therefore, if the
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor of both ﬁrms satisﬁes
− → s i
t










then ﬁrm H produces inefﬁciently and ﬁrm L produces efﬁciently every period.
Since technologies display constant returns to scale, there exists a restriction on the technologies that can
coexist in steady state. Let wi
s = ω(1,αi) denote the steady state entry-wage for the ﬁrm with technology αi


































Example 2: The demand function is D(p)=1
p, as in example 1. Suppose λ =0 .95, β = 1
r =0 .9 and





4 ' 0.587 c =0 .04
αL =0 .5 µH =0 .7 w2 =0 .63 c
θ =1 .33
I choose the parameters so that assumption AW and condition (19) holds. In this example, 3/10 of the
ﬁrms are endowed with technology αL and follow strategy fL and 7/10 of the ﬁrms have technology αH
a n dp l a ys t r a t e g yfH. The initial aggregate ﬁnancial capital is 0.3 and aH
0 =0 .21 is in hand of the ﬁrms
which follow fH while 0.09 is owned by those following fL. The steady state aggregate ﬁnancial capital is
1
r =0 .9 and the steady state entry-wages are wL
s ' 0.398 and wH
s ' 0.113. This means that in the steady
state ﬁrm H displays better prospects for advancement than ﬁrm L does. Suppose that the young workers
born at date zero also believe that ﬁrm H displays better prospects for advancement than ﬁrm L. For any
wL




















when contacted by ﬁrms H and L, respectively. First











is an IE with Ts =2if














































0 and − → mH





0 . In Figure 5, the dashed line
corresponds to p0, the solution to the ﬁrst equation, while the full line corresponds to p1, the solution to the
second equation. It turns out that for each wL





q[ , ] w1L α
µ
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1 ) satisﬁes ωH
³









and since p1 ≥ ps (αL)












∂et =0for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ {L,H}.
From date 2 on, all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. If date zero workers believe that ﬁrm L displays sufﬁciently
bad prospects for advancement, then ﬁrm L is almost driven out, in terms of market share, in the steady state.
For example, if wL
0 ≥ 0.5 then the steady state market share of ﬁrm L is smaller than 0.01, which means that
almost all the production in this industry is carried out by workers working in a ﬁrm with technology αH.I n
these steady states not only every ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts, is not ﬁnancially constrained and maximizes proﬁts,
but also almost all workers who perform the same job receive the same wage, regardless of the ﬁrm that hires
them, as in a Walrasian equilibrium. Although the steady state looks almost like a Walrasian equilibrium, these
equilibria are productively inefﬁcient in a strong sense. Notice that
− → s L
t













− → s H
t














If all labor were allocated to ﬁrm L, which produce efﬁciently, more output could be produced without altering
workers’ welfare. ¤
387. CONCLUSION
One of the most challenging tasks of economic theory is to explain how the institutions that characterize
the real world inﬂuence economic phenomena. Both casual observation as well as empirical evidence suggests
that at the early stages of industry evolution ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained and social institutions, which
are not present in the theory of the ﬁrm under perfect competition, characterize the inputs market. In many
industries, the labor market is not in a Walrasian equilibrium from the start. Instead, ﬁr m st e n dt op r o m o t e
workers internally, creating truly labor markets inside the ﬁrms. This work gives a step in trying to incorporate
such institution in the theory of industry evolution in a world where ﬁnancial markets are incomplete.
In competitive output markets, the retained earnings dynamic gives an evolutionary advantage to ﬁrms with
lower unit costs. However, unit costs are determined not only by technological efﬁciency but also by wages. In
the presence of internal promotions, unlike in Walrasian markets, worker’s expectations about the opportunities
for advancement within the ﬁrm are key to determine wages. As a consequence, the ﬁtness of a ﬁrm depends
not only on its technological efﬁciency but also on the self-fulﬁlling beliefs of the workers. This paper suggests
that, at least in the long run, the retained earnings dynamic justiﬁes the use of the standard static analysis
of competitive markets to make positive predictions but does not justify its efﬁciency properties. It shows
that the main positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model can still be accurate in the presence of
a non-Walrasian labor market and ﬁnancial constraints. In addition, by taking seriously the role of internal
promotions I show that phenomena such as self-fulﬁlling growth and the survival of inefﬁcient ﬁr m si sn o t
necessarily incompatible with convergence to a Walrasian-like state.
The results in this paper do not depend on any strong assumption on the demand side. However, I did assume
a particular CRS technology of production and homogeneity of skills among those high ability workers that
receive training. It remains an interesting open question whether the process of industry evolution converges to
a Walrasian-like equilibrium in a more general setup.
39APPENDIX
A.1 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Suppose − → v i
t+1 = − → v
j
t+1.B yd e ﬁnition, ﬁrm i displays better prospects for advance-
ment than ﬁrm j i fa n do n l yi ft h ey o u n gw o r k e r ’ sr e s e r v a t i o ne n t r yw a g ei nﬁrm i is smaller than in ﬁrm j,i . e
w
¡− → π i











.I f− → v i
t+1 = − → v
j
t+1 this holds if and only if − → π i
t ≥ − → π
j
t, as desired. ¥
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 7.1 Suppose c
θ ≥ w2 and that (f,σ) ∈ F × W is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α).I f mt > 0, then
(lt,s t,e t,w t,v t) must solve (6)
Proof of Lemma 7.1: Let R∗ (pt,σ)·mt be the value of problem (6). Suppose (f,σ) ∈ F×W is a *SPNE
but there exists t ≥ 0 and ht ∈ Ht such that mt > 0 and (lt,s t,e t,w t,v t) does not solve (6) for the ﬁrst time. If
















<R ∗ (pt,σ) · mt.L e tb f be the strategy where
b mk =
½
mk for all k ≤ t
mk
ak · b ak for all k>t
and
³
b lk,b sk,b ek, b wk,b vk
´
solves (6) for all k ≥ 0. Clearly, young and old workers would accept to work at every
k ≥ 0. Therefore, if the ﬁrm follows b f, its rate of return would be to Rk at every date k<tand for all k ≥ t


























































Proof of Proposition 4.1: Let P ∈ Σ, c





+. On the one hand,
wt · lt +( vt + c) · st + vt · et = α · mt +( w2 + c) · st + w2 · et
= α · mt + w2 · (1 + θ) · st + w2 · et







On the other hand, mt ≤ at and st ≤ λ · lt−1. Therefore, ft (T,δ,α,P) ∈ A
¡
ht¢
for all ht which proves that
f (T,δ,α,P) ∈ F. Consider the subgame that begins after the partial history ht. First, I show that the ﬁrm has
no proﬁtable deviation from f (T,δ;α,P).






= r if t ≥ T


















p∗ · r · − → a k
= β ·
pt


























Assume e f is such that
− →












a contradiction. Therefore, e f is such that
− →
e mk > 0 and
− →
e R k >
pk











e mk > 0 and pk·
− → e l α
k·
³− → e s k+
− → e e k
1+θ
´1−α
− → e mk >
pk



























≤ R∗ (pk,σs) ·
− →
e mk
Thus, the ﬁrm has no proﬁtable deviation at any proper subgame that begins at t.












w1 + β · w2. Therefore, σs
k satisﬁes (2) in the deﬁnition of a *SPNE.
Since R∗ (pt,σs)=
pt
p∗ · r,i tf o l l o w st h a t− → q t = r





w1 · λ.I fT =0 , then
41− → m0 = δ · a0 and − → mt = − → mT. Hence, (4) holds. If T>0 then m0 = a0 and − → mt =
pt−1
p∗ · r · − → mt−1 for all
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and − → mt = − → mT = δ · − → a T for all t>T.T h u s ,(4) holds. Since − → mt+1 ≤
pt−1
p∗ · r · − → mt for all




























Therefore, − → s t = 1−α
w2+c ·− → mt ≤ λ· α
w1 ·− → mt−1 = λ·− → l t−1,a l lt ≥ 1.S i n c e− → s 0 = 1−α
w2+c ·a0 ≤ λ·l−1, − → e t =0
for all t ≥ 0. Finally,
∂Π(f,σs;α|
− → ht )
∂et =0⇔
∂R(ft,σs;α|
− → ht )
∂et =0⇔ v∗ = c
θ.H e n c e ,
∂Π(f,σs;α|
− → ht )
∂et =0 . ¥
ProofofProposition4.2: Letf bethestrategyinwhichwt = w1, vt = w2 forallt ≥ 0, {lt,s t,e t,m t,b t}
T−1
t=0
is the unique solution to problem (3) and for all t ≥ T
mt =
½
δ · aT if 1−α











Clearly f ∈ F. I shall show that (f,σs) is a *SPNE. Since the workers’ strategy satisﬁes (1) and (2) in the
deﬁnition of a *SPNE, it sufﬁces to show that there is no history ht such that the ﬁrm has a proﬁtable deviation.


























for all t ≥ T, then it must be














βk+1−t · − → R k · ... · − → R t
!
· at
a contradiction since {lt,s t,e t,m t,b t}
T−1
t=0 solves problem (3) and − → R k >rfor all k ≤ T − 1.
Let (f,σ) ∈ F×W be a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α).S i n c eﬁrms pay w2 to the old workers performing task 2,
then a young worker accepts employment if and only if he is offered at least w1. Therefore, σ = σs. Consider





e at if t<T
δ · e at if t = T









· e mt,λ ·e lt−1
¸
, e et =0




+, e st ≤ λ ·e lt−1, e mt ≤ e at and e wt ·e lt +( e vt + c) · e st + e vt · e et = e mt, then















Let − → R t = pk · − → l α
k ·
³
− → s k +




− → a k + r ·







































a n di tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t− → R t =
pt
p∗ · r. Therefore,
− → q t = r
p∗ · − → mt, − → e t =0 , − → m0 = a0 and
− → mt =
½ pt−1
p∗ · r · − → mt−1 if t<T
δ ·
pT−1
p∗ · r · − → mT−1 if t = T













∂et < 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Let (f,σ) ∈ F×W be a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α). That (7) - (9) must hold
whenever mt > 0 follows by Lemma 7.1. Suppose st = Min
n
1−α
v∗+c · mt,λ · lt−1
o
.S i n c e1−α

















mt < λ and the young worker born at date t is better





















Proof of Lemma 4.2 Suppose c
θ > w2.L e tp ≥ 0 and α ∈ (0,1). Consider the equation






· p · qi (w,α) · (v∗ − w2)
Deﬁne B (w,p)=w1−β· 1−α
α · w
v∗+c ·p·qi (w,α)·(v∗ − w2)−w. A solution to (10) exists if and only if there
exists w such that B (w,p)=0 . Notice that B (w1,p) ≤ 0 and B (0,p)=w1 > 0.S i n c eB is continuous and













then wH (p2,α) <w H (p1,α). Hence,
wH is strictly decreasing in p, as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.4: Assume c




Consider the subgame that begins after partial history ht. First, I show that the ﬁrm has no proﬁtable




>rfor all 0 ≤ t ≤ T −2 and
pt · q(ω(1,α),α)=r for all t ≥ T a n db ya s s u m p t i o npT−1 · q
¡






= r if t ≥ T











· − → mH
k + r ·
¡− → a H






βk+1−t · R∗ ¡
pk,σH¢









βk+1−t · R∗ ¡
pk,σH¢





























tradiction. Assume f is such that − → mk > 0 and − → R k >
pk




, − → mk > 0 and pk ·
− → l α
k·(− → s k+
− → e k
1+θ)
1−α
− → mk >R ∗ ¡
pk,σH¢











pk · − → l α
k ·
µ
− → s k +





· − → mk
Thus, the ﬁrm has no proﬁtable deviation at any proper subgame that begins at ht.



















− → mk · (v∗ − w2)+w2
¸







w1 + β · w2. Therefore, σH




























Since s0 = 1−α















− → mk ,α
´
v∗ + c










Hence, − → e t =0for all t ≥ 0. Finally,
∂Π(fH,σH|




− → ht )
∂et =0⇔ v∗ = c
θ, as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.5: Assume c
θ > w2.L e tP ∈ Σ, w0 ∈ (w,w) and
¡
fL,σL¢
=[ f (w0;α,P),σ (w0;α,P)]
Consider the subgame that begins after partial history ht. First, I show that the ﬁrm has no proﬁtable
deviation from fL (w0;α,P). Notice that
R∗ ¡
pt,σL¢½
>r if t =0
= r if t ≥ 1











· − → mL
k + r ·
¡− → a L






βk+1−t · R∗ ¡
pk,σL¢






βk+1−t · rk−t · R∗ ¡
pt,σL¢
!
· − → a L
t
























tradiction. Assume f is such that − → mk > 0 and − → R k >
pk




, − → mk > 0 and pk ·
− → l α
k·(− → s k+
− → e k
1+θ)
1−α
− → mk >R ∗ ¡
pk,σL¢











pk · − → l α
k ·
µ
− → s k +





· − → mk
Thus, the ﬁrm has no proﬁtable deviation at any proper subgame that begins at ht.



















· (v∗ − w2)+w2
¸
























for all 0 ≤ w<ωL (pk,α).
Since s0 = 1−α
v∗+c · a0 <l −1, it follows that − → e 0 =0 .S i n c ept ≤ p∗∗ and w0 ≤ w then G(− → w t,α) ≥ 0.













− → w t
v∗ + c





ω(G(− → w t,α),α)
v∗ + c
· G(− → w t,α)
≤ λ
Hence, − → e t =0for all t ≥ 0. Finally,
∂Π(fL,σL|




− → ht )
∂et =0⇔ v∗ = c
θ,a sd e s i r e d .¥
Proof of Proposition 4.6: Let P ∈ Σ and c
θ > w2. Suppose (f,σ) ∈ F×W is a *SPNE in which − → e t =0
and τ is the ﬁrst date such that − → w τ 6= ωH (pτ,α). To show that σt = σt−τ (− → w τ;α,Pτ) for all t ≥ τ,





=m i n Θ
¡
σ (− → w τ;α,Pτ)
¯
¯ht−τ ¢
for all t ≥ τ. By proposition 4.3,
















for some t ≥ 1.T h e nwt > ωH (pt,α)
and
− → mt+1








implies minΘ(σ |hτ )=
¡
ωL (pτ,α),v∗¢
for all τ ≥ t +1 .
Since pt >p r and − → w t = ωH (pt,α) for all t<τ,t h e npt · q(− → w t,α) >rfor all t<τ.T h e n ,− → mt = at for
all t<τ.S i n c e− → e t+1 =0then by proposition 4.3 − → s t+1 = 1−α
v∗ ·− → mt+1 and − → l t = 1−α
ωH(pt,α)·− → mt which implies
that − → w t = ω
³− → mt+1
− → mt ,α
´
for all t ≥ 0. Hence, − → mτ = G(− → w τ−1,α) · aτ−1 which implies that − → mτ = − → a τ.
Therefore, − → w τ 6= ωH (pτ,α) implies that
− → mτ+1





addition, − → mτ+1 <p τ ·q(− → w τ,α)·− → mτ implies that pτ+1 ·q(− → w τ+1,α)=r. Therefore, − → w τ+1 = ωL (pτ+1,α)








t ≥ τ +1 . It follows that σt = σt−τ (− → w τ;α,Pτ) and ft = ft−τ (− → w τ,− → a τ;α,Pτ) for all t ≥ τ. ¥
A.3 Proofs of Section 5
ProofofProposition5.1: Suppose c

























∂et ≤ 0. Therefore, {P,V ∗,(f,σs)} satisﬁes conditions (3) and (4) in the deﬁn i t i o no fa nI Ea te v e r y
date t ≥ 0. From (4) in propositions 4.1 and 4.2, it follows that at date 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
− → q t =
r





· a0 = D(pt)
and at any date t ≥ T,
r
p∗ · − → mt =
r
p∗ · − → mT =
r
p∗ ·b δ · − → a T =
r








p∗ ·b δ · pT−1 · D(pT−1)=D(p∗)
It follows that the market clears at every date t ≥ 0. Hence, there exists an IE {P,V ∗,(f,σs)}. ¥
Proof of Corollary 5.1: Suppose there exists another IE in which b σ ∈ W and b P ∈ Σ. By Proposition 4.2,
b σ = σs,
− →
b q t = r
p∗ ·− → m and (4) holds for all t ≤ b T and ht ∈ Ht. By market clearing, D(b p0)= r
p∗ ·a0 = D(p0).







p∗ · at =
r





· a0 = D(pt)




. Suppose, T>b T.T h e n
p∗ · D(p∗)
r








a contradiction since pt · D(pt) <
p∗·D(p∗)
r for all t<T. Therefore, b T ≥ T. Suppose b T>T .S i n c e
D(b pT)=
r
p∗ · − → a T ≥
r
p∗ · − → mT = D(p∗)
it follows that b pT ≤ p∗, a contradiction since b pt >p ∗ for all t<b T.T h u s ,b T = T and b P = P.S i n c e
n
b lk,b sk,b ek, b mk,b bk
oT
k=t
must solve (3) at every date 0 ≤ t ≤ T, it follows that
− →
b f t = − → f t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T. ¥
Proof of Lemma 5.1: Suppose AD and AW hold and m ≤
ps·D(ps)










· m − D(p). By Lemma 4.2 and assumption AD
it follows that H is continuous and strictly increasing in both m and p.B y AD, limp→∞ H (p,m) > 0.
Since H is continuous, to show that H (p,m)=0has a solution it sufﬁces to show that there exists p such that
H (p,m) < 0. Notice that ωH ¡ps
r
¢




r ·q(w)·(v∗ − w2).S i n c e
ω(1) is also a solution to that equation, it follows that ωH ¡ps
r
¢



















ps · m − D(ps) ≤ 0 where the last inequality follows from the
47assumption that m ≤
ps·D(ps)
r . By the intermediate value theorem there exists p>
ps
r such that H (p,m)=0 .


















H [P(m),m] i fa n do n l yi fm<
pr·D(pr)
r . Hence P(m) >p r i fa n do n l yi fm<
pr·D(pr)
r , as desired. ¥
Lemma 7.2 Let c
θ > w1. Suppose 0 <m<
ps·D(ps)
r and P(m) · D(P(m)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r . Equation (11) has a











≥ Max{ps,P(m)} and pT−1 · D(pT−1) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r .
Proof of Lemma 7.2: Let c
θ > w1. Suppose 0 <m<
ps·D(ps)
r and P(m) · D(P(m)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r .S i n c e
0 <
ps·D(ps)



























. Clearly, pT−1 solves





















r . Therefore, pT−1 >p s and pT−1 ≥ Max{ps,P(m)}.
I show that pT−1·D(pT−1) ≥
ps·D(ps)























· pT−1 · q(wT−1) · β · (v∗ − w2) − ωT−1
= B (wT−1,p T−1)
andsinceB (·,p T−1)isdecreasinginitsﬁrstargument, itfollowsthatwT−1 < ωH (pT−1). Hence, ωH (P(m)) <
ωH (pT−1) which implies that P(m) >p T−1, a contradiction since D(pT−1)=q(wT−1) · m ≤ D(P(m))
and D is decreasing in p. It follows that pT−1 · D(pT−1) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r , as desired. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.2: First I consider the issue of existence of an IE and then I turn to its uniqueness.
EXISTENCE: There are two cases to consider depending on the value of P(a0) · D(P(a0)).
Case (i): P(a0) · D(P(a0)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r








· a0 = D(p)
48has a unique solution pT−1 and
ps·D(ps)
r ≤ pT−1 · D(pT−1).L e tb δ =
ps·D(ps)
r·pT−1·D(pT−1). Clearly, b δ ∈ [0,1].L e t
Ts =1and deﬁne the sequence P with elements p0 = pT−1 >p s >p r and pt = ps for all t ≥ 1. Clearly,





b δ · p0
´i














is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α) in which − → e t =0
and the value of an externally trained worker is v∗. By construction, the output market clears at date zero. At
any other date t ≥ 1,








is an IE with µH =1 .
Case (ii): P(a0) · D(P(a0)) <
ps·D(ps)
r
Let yt = a0 and
yt+1 =
(
P(yt) · D(P(yt)) if P(yt) · D(P(yt)) <
ps·D(ps)









Let τ be the ﬁrst date t such that yt ≥
ps·D(ps)
r . Clearly, τ ≥ 1 by the assumption that a0 <
ps·D(ps)
r .Is h o w







r implies that P(yt−1) ≥ pr. It follows that yt ≥ rt · a0 which implies that yt →∞ ,a
contradiction. Thus, τ is ﬁnite.
Let Ts = τ and P be the sequence with elements pt = P(yt) for all t<T s, pt = ps for all t ≥ Ts and with
pTs−1 as the solution to








r for all t<T s, then pt >p r f o ra l lf o ra l lt<T s.T o p r o v e t h a t P ∈ Σ,Is h a l ls h o w
that pTs−1 is well deﬁned and pTs−1 >p r.B yd e ﬁnition of Ts, yTs−1 <
ps·D(ps)
r . Suppose yTs−1 <
pr·D(pr)
r .
Then P(yTs−1) · D(P(yTs−1)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r a n db yL e m m a7 . 2pTs−1 is well deﬁned, pTs−1 >p s and b δ =
ps·D(ps)





b δ · pTs−1
´i







>p s · q(ω(1)) = r
Suppose
pr·D(pr)















· yTs−1 <q [ω(1)] ·
ps·D(ps)
r = D(ps) for all yTs−1 <
ps·D(ps)
r . Hence, by assumption













b δ · pTs−1
´i







>p s · q(ω(1)) = r







· yTs−1 >p r · D(pr) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r , where the last inequality
holds because pr ≥
ps







b δ · pTs−1
´i

















is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α) in which − → e t =0a n dt h ev a l u eo fa ne x t e r n a l l y
trainedworkerisv∗.Finally ,Ishallsho wt hatt heoutputm ark etclearsate v erydat et ≥ 0.S i n c e− → m0 = a0 = y0




·at−1 = P(at−1)·D(P(at−1)), it follows that − → mt = yt for all 0 ≤ t ≤ Ts−1.










· yt = D(pt)






b δ · pTs−1
´i














· yTs−1 = D(pTs−1)
Finally, at any date t ≥ Ts,
qH













e T,e δ;α, e P
´i


















e T,e δ;α, e P
´i
for some e δ ∈ [0,1] and e T ≥ e Ts




=( ft,σt) for all t ≤ T − 2 and
− →
e mT−1 =
− → mT−1 <
psD(ps)
r . It follows that e pt = pt for all t ≤ T − 2.S i n c ee pt = ps = pt for all t ≥ e T then e P 6= P if
and only if there exists T − 1 ≤ t ≤ e T − 1 such that e pt 6= ps and e pt ≥ pr. From the construction of the price





























= pr.S i n c epr · D(pr) ≥
psD(ps)

















all t ≥ T.I f
− →
e m e T−1 >
psD(ps)











e m e T−1 = q
µ
psD(ps)




e m e T−1 >q[ω(1)] ·
psD(ps)
r = D(ps)
50Then e pe T−1 <p s and e pe T−1·q
³− →
e w e T−1
´











e m e T−1 =
psD(ps)




r for all t ≥ T. Therefore,
− →
e w t = ω(1) which




=( ft,σt) for all
t ≤ e T − 2 and
− →
e m e T−1 = − → m e T−1 <
psD(ps)
r .S i n c ee δ =
psD(ps)
r·e p e T−1·D(e p e T−1) and e δ ≤ 1,t h e n
e pe T−1 · q
³− →
e w e T−1
´




e δ · e pe T−1
´´
















e m e T−1
´´
























=[ ft (T,δ;α,P),σt (T,δ;α,P)] for all t ≥ 0. ¥








be an IE in which P ∈ Σ and Ts > 1.
Suppose wL
0 ∈ (w,w).S i n c e wL










, i.e strategy L does
n o tr e i n v e s ta l le a r n i n g sa td a t e1. Hence, it must be the case that p1 · q
¡− → w L
1
¢
= r or, equivalently, − → w L
1 =
wL (p1) < ωH (p1)=− → w H















and − → w L
t = wL (pt) < ωH (pt)=− → w H
t for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. ¥

































is a *SPNE of























































































b δ · p0
´






































































for all p<e P(·). Hence p0 ≥ e P(a0), a contradiction. It follows that b δ ∈ [0,1] and wH
0 ≥ ωH (p0)=w.S i n c e
wH
0 <w L





>r . By Proposition 4.4,
¡
fH,σH¢
is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α)




∂et =0for all t ≥ 0.






⊂ (w,w) implies that
¡
fL,σL¢
is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α) where − → et =0
and
∂Π(fL,σL;α|
− → ht )








is an IE if and only if the
output market clears at every date t.S i n c e p0 solves (13) and − → mi
0 = ai
0 for i ∈ {L,H}, the output market
clears at date zero by construction. At date t ≥ 1, − → mH
t + − → mL
t = − → mH





ps · − → mi
t for





t + − → mL
t
¢

















is an IE. Since T =1 , G








0 .I tf o l l o w s









and p0 satisﬁes (13) by market clearing. Since − → m1 = G











<r ,t h e nﬁrm L would deviate and set − → m1 It follows that wL
0 ≥ ωL (p0).
Hence, wL













ra0 .S i n c eG























0 , a contradiction since I assumed that ﬁrm L





































. Hence, p0 < e P(·) because D(p0)=q

















b δ · p0
´
= − → w H
0 < ωH (p0) which implies that b δ > 1. Then − → m1 >p 0 · q















r as desired. ¥




+ such that mH + mL <
ps·D(ps)
r . First, I prove that there
exists a unique market clearing price e P
¡
mH,m L¢





mH − r · mL. I shall show that there is a unique p ≥ pr such that e H (p)=0 .S i n c ep · D(p) is concave by




is strictly convex. Notice













· (v∗ − w2) > 0. Hence,
∂2p·q(ωH(p))





∂p2 · ωH (p)






















where in the second line I use the fact that
∂2ωH(p)














∂p2 > 0 because
∂ωH(p)
∂p = −
A · ωH (p)
ωH (p)+( 1− α) · A · P






52It follows that e H (p) is strictly concave. Notice that e H (0) < 0 and






























> 0 and lim
p→∞p · D(p)=0 ,
there exists p00 > P
¡
mH + mL¢
such that e H (p00)=0 . Clearly, e H0 (p00) < 0.F o ra n yp ∈ (p0,p 00), e H (p) > 0
by the strict concavity of e H (p). For any p>p 00, e H (p) ≤ e H0 (p00) · (p − p0) < 0. It follows that p00 is the
unique market clearing price that exceeds pr. Hence, e P
¡
mH,m L¢









t=0 and P are well deﬁned.













i sa* S P N Eo ft h eg a m eΓ(P,V ∗,α).B y
proposition 4.4, it sufﬁces to show that b δ ∈ [0,1]. Notice that
b δ ≤ 1 ⇔ xL
T−1 ≤
r · pT−1 · D(pT−1) − ps · D(ps)
r · (r − G(ωL (pT−1)))




































for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2, the inequality on the right hand side implies that µL ≥
1
r, a contradiction. It follows that
¡
fH,σH¢
is a *SPNE of the game Γ(P,V ∗,α) in which − → e t =0and
∂Π(fH,σH|
− → ht )
∂et =0for all t ≥ 0.S i n c ewL















is a *SPNE of Γ(P,V ∗,α) in which − → e t =0and
∂Π(fL,σL|
− → ht )
∂et =0








is an IE it sufﬁces to show that the output market
clears on the equilibrium path. Since − → mH
t = xH
t and − → mL
t = xL







, pt = e P
¡− → mH
t ,− → mL
t
¢
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T −2, pT−1 that solves (11) and ps for all t ≥ T are the market clearing prices if a fraction µH
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